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Summary	  	  
The thesis analyzes the progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Smart Defense 
initiative. The venture is analyzed in a wider context of post-Cold War capability ventures in 
NATO. Smart Defense represents the last in a line of such initiatives. The most notable 
among these are the Defense Capabilities Initiatives (DCI) and the Prague Capabilities 
Commitment (PCC). The initiatives had similar goals of bolstering or reforming NATO’s 
conventional military capabilities. This thesis will assess the causes of shortcomings in past 
attempts, and this history is an integral part of the comparative approach where the past 
process may speak to the progress of Smart Defense. The lessons deriving from past 
experience is at the core of social sciences, where there have been several large-scale attempt 
of restructuring on order to counter security threats. The history of these initiatives could help 
provide a better understanding of the progress of the Smart Defense initiative in NATO. This 
thesis will apply the concept of the free-rider problem and organizational theory with 
Christensen et al. perspectives on organizations to explain state behavior with regards to 
alliance capability endeavors. 
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1  Introduction 
 
This thesis analyzes the progress of the Smart Defense initiative in the wider context of post-
Cold War capability initiatives in NATO. Since the beginning of the financial crisis of 2008, 
the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are still feeling the 
effects, and their focus has increasingly been directed towards national economy (as opposed 
to security). At the Chicago summit in 2012, Smart Defense was adopted as a measure to 
make the Alliance, both in force and structure, able to deal with current and future 
challenges. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated in 2012 that the 
initiative is about lining up the national requirements and NATO’s requirement. Smart 
Defense sets clear priorities, and emphasize specializing in a coordinated and deliberate way 
by design, not by default (NATO 2012b). The initiative promotes bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation with the goal of pooling and sharing resources so that member states are able to 
secure the necessary capabilities to defend the Alliance. Within NATO, the Smart Defense 
initiative is seen as a new approach that seeks to align collective requirements and national 
priorities of the Alliance member states (NATO 2012c). 
 
Smart Defense is the last of a line of capability initiatives issued by NATO. Over the past two 
decades the Alliance has gone through major reforms to adapt to the changing European 
security environment. When the Cold War ended, NATO had to reassess its collective 
defense strategy. Since then NATO has continuously transformed itself to cope with 
changing security threats. Similar to Smart Defense, previous attempts such as the Defense 
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) were measures 
to maintain the Alliance defense capability in times of need. Given the experiences from the 
conflicts in the Balkans, NATO reviewed its capabilities and decided to adapt to the changing 
environment, which resulted in the DCI (Ek 2001: 1). With changing security environment 
and limited progress in the DCI, NATO launched the PCC to address the perceived problems 
(Ek 2007:3). Ultimately, the PCC also yielded limited results. An interesting study is 
therefore what is affecting reform processes in NATO. Studying Smart Defense in light of 
previous initiatives is relevant and interesting because it provides insights on why the reform 
processes has taken its current form and why there is limited progress. More importantly, it 
can help explain the progress of Smart Defense. This thesis will show that there are 
significant challenges to overcome for the initiative to successfully transform NATO. 
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1.1 Literary review 
Since its inception, there has been a substantial amount of research on NATO. Much of the 
research has been theory driven, and has contributed to knowledge on the different aspects of 
the alliance, either it is on the role of the Alliance in an era of terrorism, the implications on 
NATO enlargement, its persistence after the Cold War, the enduring issue of burden-sharing 
problems, or on reforms in NATO (De Nevers 2007: 34; Dunay 2013: 50; McCalla 1996: 
445–446; Wolff 2009: 476; Cooper and Zycher 1989: 2). Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus 
Petersson argue that studies on security and defense have traditionally been realist in nature 
with a focus on geopolitics, or liberal with a focus on alliance dependence. After 1990, 
however, there has been an increasing focus on domestic factors as a explanatory factors for 
NATO in Europe (Matlary and Petersson 2013:4). As for their book, Matlary and Petersson 
analyze the European willingness and military ability to use force within a NATO context, in 
terms of coercion and actual deployments (Ibid: 7).  
 
Regarding NATO and theoretical approaches the great theoretical approaches on NATO in 
international relations is neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism. In 
a neorealist perspective the assumption was that NATO would wither away after the Cold 
War. The durability of the alliance, however, led to a revision of the position (Webber, 
Sperling, and Smith 2012: 35; Waltz 2000a: 18). Here Kenneth Waltz argued that despite that 
NATO had lost its major function, it is a means for maintaining U.S. interests in Europe, and 
that institutions serve primarily national rather than communal interests (Waltz 2000b:29).  
 
Neoliberal institutionalism on the other hand expects cooperation and maintains that states 
have greater incentives to maintain institutions, incentives such as investments and common 
interests. If the assumption were to be true one would expect successful results on previous 
initiatives. The perspective explains incentives for cooperation after the Cold War, with 
emerging conflicts in Europe and that maintaining NATO is less costly than the alternatives. 
In recent times, however, there has been a perceived lack of a clear and present threat, and 
recent trends indicate that the incentives is decreasing (Webber, Sperling, and Smith 2012: 
38–39; Hellmann and Wolf 1993: 14).  
 
For social constructivists institutions are expression of shared identity where allies share 
common values. Because of this the security dilemma is reduced and cooperation possible. 
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Studies on NATO in this perspective often focus on identity and norms. Identity and norms 
underpin the cohesion of NATO, and the future for the Alliance is determined by the 
continuous reaffirmation of its identity and underlying norms. The norms and identity, 
however, is challenged by internal debates and diverging interests in the Alliance (Webber, 
Sperling, and Smith 2012: 42–43).  
 
There have also been recent studies on the Smart Defense initiative that has highlighted 
several relevant aspects. Jacopo Leone Macdonald studies the challenges that Smart Defense 
faces in implementing the initiative. He argues that previous efforts has made limited 
progress, but that a series of factors appear to give the initiative renewed attractiveness and 
momentum to the cause (MacDonald 2012: 9–11). He finds that the initiative is essentially a 
political matter with fundamental sovereignty implications for all NATO members (Ibid: 24-
25). Jakob Henius focuses on the specialization pillar of Smart Defense and argues that it 
poses as the most challenging component and finds that with specialization follows 
challenges with issues such as strategic flexibility, political freedom, and implications on the 
defense industry (Henius 2012: 46–47). Claudia Major et al. argue that in order for it to 
succeed, it need to give member stats incentives to cooperate, and to address their concerns 
regarding collaboration (Major, Mölling, and Valasek 2012: 1). They find that in order to 
bolster cooperation in the Alliance through the planned pooling and sharing, more of the 
members need to be convinced that the benefits are worth the political, economic and security 
risk (Ibid: 6). Finally, Mikaela Blackwood examines how Smart Defense will help deal with 
the fiscal challenges in NATO (Blackwood 2012: 85). She finds that if the member states are 
fully committed, then Smart Defense may make a significant contribution to helping NATO 
remain a credible security actor (Ibid: 93). 
 
The research on NATO has contributed to many important findings, and recent Smart 
Defense studies has discussed relevant factors that influence reform processes. This thesis 
analyzes the Smart Defense initiative in light of previous capability initiatives. Lessons 
learned from past experience may help understand the factors that come into play in the 
current reform process, and contribute to the assessment of the Smart Defense initiative. 
Instead of using classic international relations theory, the thesis combines multiple theoretical 
perspectives.  The following section will outline this in length. 
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1.2 Research question 
This thesis provides with an explanation of reform processes in NATO with an in-depth 
analysis of previous initiatives and reforms. It will focus on the causes of shortcomings in 
past attempts, and how the favorable conditions identified in past process may speak to the 
progress of Smart Defense. The causes of shortcomings in past attempts will be mapped out 
by applying process tracing, and tested with Christensen’s et al. perspectives on organizations 
and analyzed in light of the free-rider problem. Compared to previous research, this thesis 
provides an in-depth approach on certain capability initiatives, as well as the use of 
organizational theory. This will provide a greater explanatory value because of the process 
tracing in previous initiatives, and because of applying organizational theory to explain the 
causal mechanisms affecting reform process in NATO. This approach will help identify 
patterns and causal mechanisms and strengthen the explanatory value of the findings. The 
purpose of this thesis is therefore to find out why previous initiatives yielded limited results, 
and what experience from these can help understand the goal attainment or progress of the 
Smart Defense initiative. The research question for this thesis is as following: 
 
What can past experiences say about the likelihood of the NATO Smart Defense 
initiative achieving its stated objectives? 
 
To answer this question, an analysis of the previous capability initiatives and reform 
processes will be conducted. The past experience may have implications for other areas 
within NATO, but the focus in this thesis concerns itself with a singular case, Smart Defense. 
Despite the fact that Smart Defense is a relatively new concept within the NATO framework, 
and that it currently attracts a great deal of attention, it is in reality the last of a line of 
capability initiatives in NATO. An analysis of these initiatives since the end of the Cold War 
is essential to understand what Smart Defense means for NATO. National interests and state 
sovereignty is challenges that follow initiatives such as Smart Defense. States have 
traditionally been skeptical about capability pooling as illustrated by the relative few 
examples of multilateral units. Initiatives such as Smart Defense revives old debates in the 
Alliance, so it is therefore important to contrast the concept of pooling to sovereignty, 
analyze the implications of the burden-sharing debate, the importance of domestic politics 
and organizational factors that may influence allied behavior in reform processes. All this 
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will provide an understanding of the progress of Smart Defense, and under which 
circumstances it may succeed. 
1.3 Structure of the study 
This thesis begins by outlining the theoretical framework. Starting with choosing the level of 
analysis and thereby excluding those who fails to account for the explanation of state 
behavior, this thesis chooses relevant theory and focuses the analysis of this level. The 
chapter discusses the theory and concludes by formulating the hypotheses.   
 
For this thesis the collective action and free-rider problem in combination with the three 
perspectives on organizations by Christensen et al. is chosen. This combination contribute to 
an understanding of state behavior in a situation where state interests clash with interests of 
an international institution. It will also help understand the complexities involved in aligning 
state behavior with international obligations. 
 
Next after the theoretical framework, the methodology is outlined. This thesis uses a case 
study approach combined with triangulation and process tracing. With triangulation, a use of 
primary, secondary and tertiary data will contribute to get insight on capability initiatives. 
Strengths and potential weaknesses in the methodology will be pointed out. From here, in 
addition to discuss the relevant debates within the Alliance, the previous capability initiatives 
are outlined.  
 
Finally, the Smart Defense initiative is analyzed in light of the theoretical perspectives and 
informed by experience from past initiatives. The hypotheses will be discussed before the 
conclusion. 
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2 Theory and Methodology 
 
This chapter outlines the analytical framework for this thesis. The chapter is laid out in a 
straightforward manner with three interconnected sections. For one, the starting point is a 
discussion on the chosen level of analysis. Selecting the relevant level of analysis will help 
exclude explanations and selecting appropriate theory. Section two discusses of the relevant 
theoretical perspectives. Because this thesis seeks to identify the causes of shortcomings in 
previous capability initiative, and how favorable conditions identified in past process may 
speak the progress of Smart Defense, it will use the collective action problem and 
organizational theory. Section three discusses the methodological framework. The chosen 
approach is a case study that relies on triangulation and process tracing. 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
The role of theory in this thesis is to help shed light on the decision-making behavior with 
regards to the capability initiatives and contribute to an understanding of the challenges 
NATO faces with in reform processes. The theoretical framework consists of the collective 
action and free-rider problems as a general model, and is supplemented by the instrumental, 
cultural and myth perspective. The instrumental perspective emphasizes the ability to exert 
political control and to engage in clear organizational thinking and rational calculation of 
causal relationships and effects. The cultural perspective challenges instrumental assumptions 
and emphasize the limits and possibilities lying within established cultures and traditions. 
The myth perspective highlights adjustments to existing values and belief in the environment 
to understand how organizational changes occur and its effect and implications (Christensen 
et al. 2007: 13).  
 
There are several approaches to study NATO, but for this thesis an exploratory research that 
will generate hypotheses. Using unfamiliar theory in cases such as NATO is at the hart of 
social science inquest. Adding the three perspectives on organizations to free-riding and 
collective action problems is fruitful for studying an initiative that is an ongoing process. The 
following sections will discuss the chosen level of analysis and the theoretical perspectives 
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chosen to analyze reform processes in NATO. The final section will sum up the theoretical 
framework and the hypotheses. 
2.1.1 Climbing the explanatory ladder 
The first choice any scholar dealing with alliance reform faces is to select the appropriate 
level of analysis. There are numerous possible approaches. The one chosen here is Anders 
Wivel and Hans Mouritzen’s “explanatory ladder”, inspired by inter alia Kenneth Waltz and 
Graham Allison. They define three levels of analysis, the intra-state, inter-state and systemic. 
By excluding one level, and climb a step, we reduce the distance from the object of 
explanation, to the source of explanation. This simplifies the explanatory task, and allows us 
to exclude some explanatory models and focus the attention on one level. This in turn can 
help excluding theoretical approaches (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012: 25–26). 
 
Starting at the intra-state level of explanation where the competition between political parties, 
interests groups, opinions or bureaucracies is in focus. These interests compete to reach the 
decision-makers agenda, and encompasses misperceptions and idiosyncrasies, as well as 
other elements in decision-making process (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012: 25). Explanations at 
this level are useful when the decision maker is a key variable. An example is the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis when Kennedy and Khrushchev faced the possibility of nuclear war. 
Why they found themselves in these situations, however, cannot be explained at the 
individual level. As Nye Jr. and Welch argue, there may be something at a higher level, or in 
the structure of the situation that brought them to that point. As in the case of NATO, the 
states and state leaders behave more or less similarly in terms of budgets cuts and decision-
making behavior. Preliminary analysis indicates that there is a concurrent trend with 
decreasing budgets, lack of investment in capability development and no unity to live up to 
alliance ventures. The explanation is therefore more likely found at the systemic or inter-state 
level (Nye Jr. and Welch 2011: 48–49; Mouritzen and Wivel 2012: 25). 
 
The systemic level is at the top of the ladder. This level is characterized by states relative 
power and the importance of capabilities. Here, one of the primary incentives is provided by 
the distribution of power in the system. The states face the same anarchic environment, which 
is the international system. This system, whether it is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, is 
believed to be the decisive explanatory factor and motivation for decisions. States balance 
against each other, and systemic power matters (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012: 25).  This level 
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looks at how the overall system constrains state action. At first glance in this case, however, 
the systemic explanation seems ill suited. After the Cold War, there have been changes in 
states interests and attitudes towards balancing. In his book, Waltz describes a world where 
states seek own interests and using military force as a mean of achieving goals. There is a 
constant possibility of war in a world where there are multiple sovereign states seeking to 
promote a set of interests, and not having any overreaching agency to rely on protection 
(Waltz 2001: 227–238). Neorealists argued that without a common threat, the Alliance would 
not survive. This argument, however, have been proven wrong. Today, the world is different 
and state behavior in reforms in NATO seems to be explained on another level. The systemic 
level cannot with confidence be excluded, but for this thesis, the explanation seems to be 
located at a lower level of analysis. The focus is instead directed towards the inter-state level 
of analysis, as will be discussed	  (Nye Jr. and Welch 2011: 53–54). 
 
Between the intra-state level and systemic level is the inter-state level, which it seems most 
likely that the explanation is. Most important argument here is that NATO is an inter-state 
alliance with equal membership. The members are national states and the decision-making 
take shape of inter-state bargaining. On this level states will, if possible, relevant or realistic, 
balance proximate rather than systemic power. This balancing happens through internally 
mobilized resources or with a credible ally. If these conditions fail to occur, the states will 
bandwagon with the power asserter (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012: 123). As Nye Jr. and Welch 
argue, when explaining on the inter-state level of analysis, one seeks to explains whether 
what happens in world politics is a function of domestic politics, features of domestic society, 
or the machinery of the government. They argue that in international politics, domestic 
considerations are important. Because of the characteristics of the Alliance, as well as the 
decision-making, the explanation seems to be located at the inter-state level of analysis (Nye 
Jr. and Welch 2011: 51).  
 
The assessment indicates therefore that the inter-state level is the appropriate level of 
analysis. The two other levels are not irrelevant, but the systemic or intra-state effects seem to 
have little influence on the reform processes, as the effects that is found on inter-state level. 
The thesis will therefore use collective action and the free-rider problem as well as the three 
perspectives on organizations by Christensen et al. Choosing the level of analysis may seem 
to exclude some relevant explanations, and in doing this implicitly conclude that the factors 
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at the inter-state level is affecting the progress of capability initiatives in NATO. An 
important note here, however, is that it is this field of research and level of analysis that deals 
with the problems of alliance politics and covers the questions that are relevant for this thesis. 
In this field of study, there are several important contributions. Among these are Mancur 
Olson and Richard Zeckhauser’s research on burden-sharing, and Oran R. Young’s study on 
cooperation and international regime formation. 
 
Olson and Zeckhauser’s article outlined a model that sought out to explain the workings of an 
international organization. They find that in an alliance the individual members, especially 
smaller members, have incentives to stop providing collective good. They argued that it is 
because they have “little or no incentive to provide additional amounts of the collective good 
once the larger members have provided the amounts they want for themselves, with the result 
that the burdens are shared in a disproportionate way”. Large nations tend to bear 
disproportionate shares of the burden in international organizations, and the resources 
devoted to a alliance by the nations is determined by national interest (Olson and Zeckhauser 
1966: 278). Young, on the other hand, looked at cooperation and international regime 
formation. He argued that the probability of suboptimal outcomes in international 
organizations or institutions generally increases as the number of the participants increases 
(Young 1989: 2). New institutional arrangements, or institutional change, will result in 
conflicting interests and bargaining (Ibid: 66-67).  
 
These contributions deal with several of the problems of collective action and the 
implications of the free-rider problem. They bring up important issues concerning the issues 
that we see in NATO today, such as explanations for disproportionate burden-sharing and the 
role of national interests, and the general problem of collective action often referred to as the 
“Tragedy of the commons”.  
 
2.1.2 Free-riding and the tragedy of the commons 
With the chosen level of analysis, the theoretical perspective that will be used to shed some 
light on the factors affecting reforms in NATO and the Smart Defense initiative is collective 
action and free-riding problems. The free rider argument help explain alliance behavior in 
committing to different ventures in NATO and it may give some insights on the challenges 
related to the Smart Defense initiative. As a defense Alliance, NATO faces challenges 
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regarding collective action, which influence many areas of operation. Even though it is not a 
theory of domestic politics, collective action problems, or the free-rider problem, derive from 
national or self-interests, and the problems bring up many of the relevant discussion in 
NATO today. 
 
The term collective action refers to activities that require coordination of efforts by two or 
more individuals. Richard Cornes argue that collective action problems are typically 
characterized by “interdependences among the participants, so that the contributions or 
efforts of one individual will influence the contributions or efforts of other individuals”. One 
of the collective action problems that are related to these issues is the free-rider problem 
(Cornes 1996: 324). Todd Sandler argues that pure public goods that are nonexclusive will 
lead to a free-rider problem because the provider will be unable to keep those who do not 
contribute from consuming the benefits of the good. If the public good is already provided, 
and requests on contributions come afterward, the actors involved will have strong incentives 
to understate or hide its true derived benefits. By doing this, the contributions are seen as 
meager, compared to the benefits received. There is no reason to reveal the true gains of the 
good through contributing, because the money can be spent on excludable goods (Sandler 
2004: 47). Individuals will therefore fail to contribute their share, because the benefits are 
already provided. This enables free-riding behavior where individuals can save considerable 
resources to spend on other excludable goods. Thus, with a pure public good, comes a 
collective action problem. As Sandler argues, collective action failure rests on a single 
premise of that individual rationality is not sufficient for collective rationality (Ibid: 18).  
 
Garrett Hardin describes the collective action and free-rider problem illustrative in “Tragedy 
of the commons”. In his article he illustrates a pasture, which is commonly open to all 
herdsmen and their cattle’s. Here the benefits of grazing an additional head of cattle on the 
common ground, exceeds the private costs. Because the herdsman increases its sales from 
letting an additional animal use the grounds, it is seen as a rational action. The sensible 
course is therefore to add another cattle, and then another and so fourth. Every herdsman 
sharing the common ground reaches this conclusion, which in turn leads to the tragedy of the 
commons. Behaving rationally in terms of self-interests, ruin the common ground and the 
collective long-term benefits for all the herdsmen (Hardin 1968: 1244). To sum up the 
argument, the tragedy of overgrazing, is an result from every persons incentive to free-ride 
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regardless of the expected action of others. Even if an agreement is struck, in which it 
specifies that all herdsmen will refrain from further grazing, the strict dominance of the 
individual strategy, consequently make such contract unstable (Runge 1984: 159). 
 
In general, the free rider problem is where one actor relies on a public good supported by 
another. And these public goods can be characterized both by its non-rivalness in 
consumption, and by the fact that the provider cannot exclude those who do not contribute. If 
this pure public good is provided to a group, a member can reap the benefits while failing to 
contributing much to its production. By this logic, one would assume that free riding is 
individually rational, but collectively irrational (Cornes 1996: 30; Pasour Jr. 1981: 455). The 
argument was in 1966 developed by Olson and Zeckhauser. They argued that defense in an 
alliance is considered a pure public good. The benefits that are associated with defense 
spending are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption among allies (Olson and 
Zeckhauser 1966: 267; Plümper and Neumayer 2012: 6).  
 
In this context, a free-rider is anyone who contributes less than their “true marginal value 
derived form a non-excludable public good”. A free-rider problem emerges when a good 
becomes non-excludable, which many will fail to contribute because the good’s benefits is 
free once it is provided by others, and in so doing, the free-rider saves costs that can be used 
on other excludable goods (Sandler 1992: 17). Olson used the free rider logic of exploitation 
of the large by the small on disproportionate burden-sharing in a military alliance (Ibid: 54-
55). The presence of purely public deterrence means that some free-riding will occur, even 
under a club arrangement such as NATO (Ibid: 101). The important argument here is that 
NATO has one big security producer and many smaller security consumers. In terms of this 
thesis, this problem of collective action and free-riding may contribute to shed light on the 
research question, thereby help understand what influences reform processes in NATO, and 
furthermore the progress of Smart Defense.  
 
In order to use these principles a conceptualization by Glenn Snyder may help guide the 
arguments. Snyder addresses the problem of collective action and conceptualize the potential 
strategies available for the allies into four broad categories. These tell us about the level of 
commitment in alliance ventures, and its consequences. Snyder bases these categories on the 
assumption of security dilemma, but as argued, this thesis cannot ignore the systemic 
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explanation, where it may provide some valuable insights. When faced with a choice of 
committing to an alliance venture, the potential strategic responses for the members of 
NATO would fall in to four broad categories outlined by Snyder. Allies can defect, de-align, 
cooperate, or abrogate. Defecting or cooperating is the two absolute strategies. The first refer 
to a weak or no commitment to alliance goals or commitment. The latter refers to that there 
are strong commitment and in turn support for alliance goals or commitments. Snyder points 
out here that these alternatives have prospective good and bad consequences. Snyder argues 
that, in a security dilemma “the principal “bads” are  “abandonment” and “entrapment”, and 
the principal “goods” are a reduction in the risks of being abandoned or entrapped by the 
ally” (Snyder 1984: 466).  
 
In line with the systemic level of analysis, in a system characterized by more than one pole, 
the fear of abandonment is ever present. And alliances in international system are never 
absolutely firm. In general, abandonment of the alliance ventures is defection, but there are 
two relative strategies of this, which is to de-align or abrogate. De-align means failing to 
make good on his explicit commitments. Abrogate, on the other hand, means fail to provide 
support in contingencies where support is needed or expected. Snyder pointed out that “in 
both of the latter two variants, the alliance remains intact, but the expectations of support 
which underlie it are weakened” (Snyder 1984:466). Arguably, the implications of the 
collective action and the free-rider problem could be structured under these potential 
strategies of de-aligning or abrogating. These strategies could therefore be used more 
specifically in assessing the strategies chosen by allies in the reform processes (Ibid). 
 
The other principal bad in the security dilemma, entrapment, means being dragged into a 
conflict because of an ally’s interests, which one do not share, or only partially shares. As 
Snyder argues “The interests of allies are generally not identical; to the extent they are 
shared, they may be valued in different degree” (Snyder 1984: 467). Entrapment occurs 
therefore when one ally values the preservation of the alliance more than fighting for the 
interest of another ally. Entrapment is therefore more likely to occur if an ally does not 
cooperative in disputes with opponents, because of his confidence in ones support. The 
greater the ally is dependent on the alliance, and the stronger the commitment to the ally, the 
higher the risk is for entrapment (Ibid). 
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To sum up, for this thesis, the collective action and free-rider problem will be used to guide 
analysis of the past initiatives, as well as the Smart Defense initiative. In order to apply these 
concepts in the analysis, the four categories outlined by Snyder’s provide an additional 
perspective on the collective action and free-rider problem. In order to achieve a more 
complete image of the mechanisms affecting NATO reforms, however, the thesis will apply 
the three perspectives outlined by Christensen et al. 
 
2.1.3 Understanding organizations – Three perspectives 
The discussion of past research illustrate that there are different approaches to study NATO. 
There are still some issues concerning the level of detail and complexity, or the lack of 
explanatory strength. This is why in this thesis a choice is made to step outside the commonly 
used theories in international relations and instead combine theory of collective action with 
theory of public policy and administration. Specifically, the problems with collective action 
and free-riding is combined with Tom Christensen et al. “three perspectives” on 
organizations. The perspectives can be considered as conceptual lenses through which to 
view the Smart Defense initiative. The perspectives are not commonly used in NATO 
research, but what they provide is a focus on not only one, but on groups of explanatory 
factors. Since the goal for the thesis is to say something about an initiative that is an ongoing 
process, and to get the most out of empirical data, the three perspectives is chosen. 
 
Instrumental perspective 
The assumption is that because organizations provide a function on behalf of a community, 
they can be understood as instruments or tools for achieving certain goals that are deemed 
important. Members of the organization act with instrumental rationality in performing its 
tasks to achieve the desired results. They therefore assess available alternatives or tools 
according to their perceived costs and rewards, and in relation to the chosen goals. From this 
they make willful choices between these alternatives and achieve the desired effect. This 
instrumentality is in accordance with means-ends assessments, which determines how its 
members behave in doing its tasks. It can also be expressed in the structural design of the 
organization in itself. Instrumentality can therefore involve both the effects of the 
organizational structure as well as the process that structure is determined and formed 
(Christensen et al. 2007: 20–21). 
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When studying organizations as instruments, the goals and means-end conceptions of the 
relevant organizations and members must be clarified, which includes the choice of action 
and whether and how the result of an action is in accordance with the desired outcome. 
Actions are therefore built on “logic of consequence”. The formal organizational structure is 
a structure consisting of positions and rules. The rules determine the responsibilities and 
define how various tasks should be executed.  Organizations are composed by set of positions 
and subordinated units. Because of the structure of sub-units and division of labor, it makes 
for a heterogeneous perspective on organizations. Coalitions make room for different goals or 
interests, as well as diverse resources for the articulation of interests. Individual sub-units and 
members can act instrumentally. To achieve their objectives in this environment, 
organizations and their sub-units can enter coalitions. This view of an organization is 
important for the case of NATO where differing interests come into play in reform processes 
(Christensen et al. 2007: 21).  
 
In their book, Christensen et al. argue that having a formal organizational structure implies 
that different norms for practices exist independently of the individual holding a position at 
any time. The formal norms is usually expressed through rules, regulations, organizational 
charts and manuals (Christensen et al. 2007: 24). Challenges that are new or unknown, which 
involves uncertainty, cannot always be dealt with by the use of established rules and 
procedures. Therefore, they may consequently result in ad hoc routines and organizational 
solutions. In reforming an organization, different individuals or groups may have different 
goals and interests. In a negotiation-based perspective, organizations can be understood as 
coalitions with the actors behaving instrumentally. The motivation is self-interests, and they 
can enter coalitions with actors outside the organization that has common interests (Ibid: 28-
29).  Conception of the existing structure may help determine how problems and solutions are 
defined. From a negotiation-based instrumental perspective, the existing structures and ways 
of organizing the reform process may be a result from previous bargaining and compromise. 
In addition, it provides directives for the course and outcome of reform processes. This is 
because there are interests in these structural features. I regards to NATO, this means that 
new reform processes may reveal old patterns of interests (Ibid: 123-124). 
Based on a negotiation-instrumental perspective the performance of reforms is dependent on 
existing organizational structure, and the organizing of the reform process. Goals and 
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perception of the current situation influence reforms and change. If new decision-makers 
arrive the organizations with new goals, they are likely to be put on the agenda. Reforms can 
also happen if new knowledge is gained about consequences of new organizational designs, 
and how they might be implemented. The outcome of reforms determined by conditions that 
other actors have certain control over. This is why leaders must enter coalitions to promote 
their goals and interests (Christensen et al. 2007: 133–134). Another view of reforms in this 
perspective is based on hierarchy. Here the leadership calculates the costs and benefits of 
existing and other relevant designs, and recommend reform if the alternatives are deemed 
better for achieving the organizational goals. Bounded rationality is an important factor here. 
Acquiring information on alternative designs and implementing these alternatives might 
entail costs. As Christensen et al. argues “if one takes into consideration information and 
implementation costs, then the present organizational form will have a certain advantage” 
(Ibid). 
 
Cultural perspective 
As opposed to the instrumental perspective, in the cultural perspective the norms and values 
are emphasized. The organizational culture is here associated with formal and informal norms 
and values that evolve and become important for the activities of organizations. Here a 
distinction between informal norms and formal norms in organizations is important. They 
have different origins and operate in different ways, though they can influence each other. 
According to the “logic of consequence” the goals are often given a priori, or by political 
leaders. These goals are achieved through formal structures and norms. This perspective, 
however, assumes a “logic of appropriateness” where the goals are discovered in the course 
of a process and informal norms, values and identities gradually develops. Here, the 
organizations acquire institutional features and become institutionalized. As the complexity 
of the organization increases, the less flexible or adaptable it becomes to new demands 
(Christensen et al. 2007: 37–38).  
 
The logic of appropriateness means that when acting in public situations, one will not 
primarily act rationally according to careful deliberation of pro and contra arguments. Nor 
will it act out of self-interests or assessments of possible consequences of actions. Instead one 
engages in “matching”, where rules for action are deployed in order to link situations and 
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identities. What this means is that matching occurs intuitively and the organizational culture 
entails a consistent set of rules and identities, so that such links are easy to take. The cultural 
perspective and appropriate action explains that action has normative and institutional 
foundation. For instance, it may be appropriate to act in accordance with norms and values 
built on equality and considerations of general practicability. According to this logic, cultural 
attitudes and actions of members will become systematic. By gaining experience from 
institutional culture, it will learn what is appropriate. Organizational culture is thereby 
established trough evolutionary, natural development processes, which adapts through 
internal and external pressures (Christensen et al. 2007: 40–43).  
 
A central aspect, which is important for this thesis, is path dependency. Norms and values 
that have significant influence on an organization in its early and formative years will have 
great significance for the subsequent years. As Christensen et al. argues “a public 
organization is established at a specific point in history and hence is shaped by specific 
cultural contexts or norms and values that leave a permanent impression on it” (Christensen 
et al. 2007: 45). This means is that goals that are established in the origin of an organization 
will have significant influence for its subsequent development. Because the costs of chaning 
the organization often becomes too great, they are not easy to change, not even when contexts 
and environments change. This is referred to as “historical inefficiency”. According to this 
perspective it is possible to live with such historical inefficiency over time (Ibid: 46).  
 
Path dependency has its benefits and drawbacks. On the positive side, it gives stability and 
depth to informal values and norms in an organization. Determining appropriate behavior and 
grasping the cultural framework to operate within is easier. In addition, matching between 
known identities and situations become easier, and institutional rules of action can function 
effectively. On the negative side, however, historical bias may cause the intuitional features 
to render the organization inflexible. This becomes a problem when the environment is in 
rapid change and a gap emerges between external challenges and internal culture. 
Institutional characteristics and rules for action can function as obstacles for change 
(Christensen et al. 2007: 46). When organizations do reform in this perspective, it occurs 
incrementally, even glacially. Instead of revolution, there is evolution. It is a process where 
traditional values and norms are balanced against new ones, in a process of adaption to 
external as well as internal pressures. In the cultural perspective, the fate of a reform depends 
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on the degree to which there is normative correspondence between the new and those existing 
in the organization. If they are incompatible with established norms and values, they will be 
rejected. Parts that are compatible, however, will be implemented, and the controversial parts 
will be interpreted in a way as to become palatable (Christensen et al. 2007: 132).  
 
Reforms occur as a consequence of changed perceptions on the situation the organization 
faces, on the identity or what it stands for. It is therefore a matter of a relationship between 
situation and identity. Organizational features that already is embedded, is important because 
they provide the basis for understanding appropriate behavior. Development of organizational 
forms or designs will be path dependent. Here are changes characterized by gradual adaption 
centered on one state of equilibrium, which is punctuated by abrupt and powerful upheavals. 
Following this is a new phase of incremental changes around a new state of equilibrium. 
Radical changes like this are dubbed “critical junctures”. There may be variations in 
structural arrangements between different parts of an organization. Tradition and norms 
varies from sector to sector, and provide the basis for path dependency. This argument with 
path dependency will contribute to the explanation of the factors affecting NATO reforms 
(Christensen et al. 2007: 134–135). 
 
Myth perspective 
With this third perspective, a critical conception is that organizations operate in institutional 
environments. In these environment organizations are confronted with socially created norms 
for how they should function and how they should be designed. These norms must be 
incorporated and reflected outwards, even if they fail making the organizations activities 
more effective. This process makes organizations more similar on the surface, which is in 
contrast to the multiplicity described in the cultural perspective. Christensen et al. 
unceremoniously dubs socially created norms in institutional environments “myths” 
(Christensen et al. 2007: 57). 
 
Myths spread through imitation and can be adopted by organizations without producing 
instrumental effects. Leaders may promote myths and signal that they are adopted in the 
organization, when in reality little effort is made to do so. This is to seek legitimacy in 
institutional environments. The norms are reflected in a wide repertoire of general ideas and 
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more precise recipes for how modern, and thus legitimate, organizations should look. These 
recipes becomes attractive and is something “all” organizations should adopt at a certain time 
(Christensen et al. 2007: 58). The organizational environment is complex where different 
parts of an organization strive to gain legitimacy from a range from external actors. They are 
confronted with many different and inconsistent changing ideas and recipes for legitimate 
structures and procedures. Myths are these socially legitimated ideas and recipes for how to 
design parts of an organization. It is an idea that excites, grabs attention and has achieved 
good status in other organizations (Ibid).  
 
Rationalized myths refer to myths that are convinced to be an effective tool for achieving 
specific organizational goals. Organizations, despite this, often experience situations where 
the instrumental effects of adopting a popular recipe, fail to match expectations. A 
rationalized myth may be defined as a non-scientifically justified conviction that a recipe is 
grounded in research and rationality. Independently of whether myths result in expected 
effects, they are still institutionalized in the sense that for a period is it taken for granted that 
they are timely and efficient (Christensen et al. 2007: 58–59). 
 
In reforming organizations a similarity or isomorphic effect occurs between the 
organizations. Because organizations adopt widespread myths, or similar features they 
become isomorphic (Christensen et al. 2007: 124). In reform processes there are special units 
that interpret popular myths for what organizations should look like and function. In order to 
gain legitimacy for the environment reform processes are usually generally accepted 
methods, where the use of imitation is common (Ibid: 126-127). Reform initiatives that 
corresponds with current doctrine of how a “good organization” should operate, will gain 
acceptance. Initiatives that diverge from this are therefore not chosen. The greater the 
correspondence is between problem definitions and suggestion solutions in reform programs, 
the easier it will be to gain legitimacy (Ibid: 132).  
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2.1.4 Hypotheses 
To sum up the theoretical framework, using the concept of collective action and free-rider 
problem in combination with the instrumental, cultural and myth perspective can contribute 
to the explanation of why the allies failed to live up to the commitments the capability 
initiatives. The collective action and free-rider problem provides the general understanding of 
the behavior in reform processes, and the three perspectives provide with more depth and 
explanatory factors needed to explain the mechanisms that affect reforms in NATO. This 
section will state four hypotheses that will be used in the analysis of the Smart Defense 
initiative. 
 
For one, the collective action and free-rider problem assumes that because defense in NATO 
has become a non-excludable good, the smaller allies will fail to provide support and free-
ride on the contributions to the Alliance. In so doing the free-rider saves costs that could be 
used on excludable goods, such as goods that fulfill the national priorities. As outlined in 
Hardin’s “Tragedy of the commons”, it is individually rational, but collectively irrational. 
From this assumption the smaller allies will fail to take their share of the defense burden, 
which leads to a disproportionate burden-sharing in the Alliance. From this the following 
hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H1:  NATO’s Smart Defense initiative will have little chance of success due to free-riding 
behavior in sharing of the defense burden. 
  
Two, the instrumental perspective argues that organizational structure affect decision-
making. In addition to this the instrumental emphasize that the actors have limited rationality 
and that reform happens not only in accordance with existing structure, but also through 
negotiations and assessment of the current organizational structure. Furthermore, within 
organizations, coalitions are created in order to achieve certain goals, which make room 
conflicting interests in the organization. Therefore, from the instrumental perspective 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H2:  NATO’s Smart Defense initiative will have little chance of success due to diverging 
interests between allies. 
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Three, as opposed to the instrumental perspective, the cultural perspective emphasizes the 
importance of institutionalized organizations. Embedded norms and values from the early 
years of an organization affect future action. It influences subsequent development and are 
not easy to change, not even in an otherwise reform-favorable environment. This path 
dependency argument will be important in the analysis of Smart Defense. In addition, the 
cultural perspective emphasize that reforms occur as a consequence of changed perceptions 
on the situation the organization faces. This may involve the organizations identity or its 
fundamental goal. Therefore, with this perspective, following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H3:  NATO’s Smart Defense initiative will have little chance of success due to an 
organizational structure that is institutionalized and path dependent. 
 
Finally, the myth perspective emphasizes the importance of myths and how organizations 
adopt attractive recipes for organizational design, although they may not be optimal. In order 
for organizations to gain legitimacy, they often use generally accepted methods. These 
recipes for organizational design may be popular recipes that “all” organizations use at a 
certain time, and imitation is therefore common. Therefore, with this perspective, following 
hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H4:  NATO’s Smart Defense initiative will have little chance of success due to the structure 
of the reform. 
 
These hypotheses will be tested in the empirical analysis, and will contribute to a more 
complete understanding of reform processes in the Alliance more important the progress of 
Smart Defense. 
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2.2 Methodological framework 
With the theoretical framework outlined, the following section outlines the research design 
and methodology for the thesis. To answer the research question a case study approach in 
combination with process tracing and triangulation will be used. The strengths and limits 
with the case study approach will be pointed out. Other methods may provide different 
insight on the subject of study, but they may have some weaknesses in providing a complete 
picture of the dynamics affecting the progress of implementing capability initiatives in 
NATO. This section will therefore discuss the methodological framework chosen for this 
thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Case study 
There are various ways to understand the case study as a scholarly method, but most analysts 
agree on the following arguments. Case study can be defined as an intensive study of a single 
case that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context. 
The overall goal is to shed light on a larger population of cases (Gerring 2006:20; Yin 
2009:18). Not only does it enable in-depth study of a phenomenon, but it also provides an 
understanding of the contextual conditions (Yin 2009:18). The phenomenon under study in 
this thesis is capability initiatives in NATO since 1990. Assessing specific reform plans in-
depth over time provides the insight needed in order to discuss the progress of Smart 
Defense.  
 
Choosing capability initiatives in NATO as case study is based on several arguments. For 
one, since the early 1990’s there has been a transformation process in NATO. Despite of 
several limited attempts, NATO, at the 2012 Chicago Summit, launched its latest capability 
initiative, seeking to bolster the alliance capabilities and promoting burden sharing. The fact 
that capability initiatives are repeatedly launched is an important motivation to study the 
progress of the reforms. Two, because there are contextual differences in which the initiatives 
has been launched, studying these in a longer process allow us to identify what affected the 
performance of these initiatives, as well as how NATO changed with these. Finally, by 
studying this process over time may give us an indication of NATO’s ability to reform. 
Selecting capability initiatives in NATO and use past initiatives to shed light on the factors 
that come into play in reform process will provide a more complete understanding of the 
challenges NATO faces in implementing capability initiatives.   
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Case studies also allow the researcher to approach given phenomenon in depth, which 
encompasses contextual conditions because of their importance to the phenomenon in study. 
It enables the researcher to cope with technically distinctive situations (Yin 2009:18). When 
studying decisional behavior, case study research may offer insight to the intentions, the 
reasoning capabilities, and the information-processing procedures of the actors involved in a 
given setting. Investigating a single case allows one to test the causal implications of a 
theory, and thus providing corroborating evidence for a causal argument (Gerring 2006:45). 
It can contribute with a thick description of events, and can identify causal arguments on the 
basis of few cases (Ibid: 48). In addition to this, case studies are suitable to deal with a 
variety of evidence, such as documents, interviews and observations (Yin 2009:11). 
 
Other methods, such as surveys, try to deal with phenomenon and context and are limited in 
the ability in investigating the context (Yin 2009:18). The variables chosen for the study may 
also not reflect the real situation in the different member countries. Statistical data based on 
states capabilities may contain either more or less of what the members actually possess in 
capabilities, which may lead to false conclusions. A qualitative approach provides a more 
complete understanding of reform processes in NATO. This approach also allows an in-depth 
study on NATO with public and accessible documents, both official and academic. Because 
this thesis does not seek to identify a causal effect rather the casual mechanisms that come 
into play in implementing capability initiatives, a qualitative approach is therefore more 
fruitful. 
 
2.2.2 Triangulation 
To ensure the findings in the case study, triangulation will be applied. Triangulation has 
increasingly been used in social science research. It does not necessarily entail using both 
quantitative and qualitative data, but also different methods of data collection (Bergman 
2008:23). Norman K. Denzin (1970) defined triangulation to encompass in total four 
different varieties of triangulation: methodological, theoretical data and investigator 
triangulation. For this thesis, however, the most common type, methodological triangulation, 
will be applied (Duffy 1987:131).  
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In methodological triangulation the researcher uses two or more methods of data collection 
procedure within a single study. This can take two forms, within-method and between-
method triangulation. Relevant for this thesis is within-method triangulation, which is most 
frequently used when the phenomenon under study is multidimensional. The researcher 
chooses one method, and applies several strategies to examine the data. This could entail 
retrieving official and research documents as well as getting statements from relevant 
subjects (Duffy 1987:131).  
 
For this thesis primary, secondary and tertiary sources from NATO will function as the 
empirical base. The different sources supplements each other and contribute to a more overall 
understanding of the initiatives. In order to deal with the insecurity and ambiguities with the 
different aspects of the initiatives, interviews will be conducted. In addition to bring in 
theoretical propositions, there will be elements of both qualitative and quantitative sources. 
To get an image of the development of defense expenditures since the 1990’s there will be 
tables that are created in Microsoft Excel. Official data from NATO and other sources is 
used. Using triangulation as a tool for combining different methods and data sources, may 
contribute to a more complete set of findings of the performance of the capability initiatives. 
This can contribute to a greater understanding of the case study. 
 
The advantage of triangulation is that it allows the researcher to reduce the threats of validity 
and reaching false conclusions when using different data, and use different sources to collect 
the data (Bergman 2008:23; Yin 2009: 114–115). There is greater need for multiple sources 
in case studies than in other research methods. Triangulation in case studies allow a wide 
variety of evidence that other methods do not, which allow looking at a case from different 
angles (Yin 2009:115).  
 
2.2.3 Process tracing 
When triangulating the data, the method chosen to assess how the previous capability 
initiatives performed is process tracing. David Collier defines process tracing as “the 
systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research 
questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011:823). Process tracing will 
be an important tool in mapping out the causal mechanisms that affect reform processes of 
the capability initiatives. By triangulating the data, the thesis outlines this development. This 
 
 
24	  
involves an exploratory analysis, which process tracing is a useful method. An important note 
here is that instead of using process tracing in detail, the thesis will map out the process of the 
initiatives, studying how they performed and see what lessons we can learn from them. 
 
In qualitative analysis, process tracing are considered a fundamental tool used by scholars to 
carry out within-case analysis with qualitative data. The method can contribute to describe 
political and social phenomena by evaluation causal with a focus on sequences of dependent, 
independent, as well as intervening variables. Given that the case gets a fine-grained 
knowledge, this method can shed light on several aspects of the factors affecting reforms in 
NATO. By systematically identifying unknown, or new phenomena, process tracing can 
evaluate prior explanatory hypotheses. With this, it can assess these causal claims in the 
newly discovered hypotheses (Collier 2011: 823–824).  
 
Process tracing also allows the researcher to identify variables that have been left out in 
previous comparisons of cases, and it allows causal inferences based on a few number of 
cases (George and Bennett 2005:215). This allows focus on events or situations that unfolds 
over time. To grasp this unfolding, the researcher must be able to make a description of that 
event or situation at a certain point in time. To achieve a fine-grained description of the cases, 
process tracing therefore must sometimes use both qualitative and quantitative data. This 
thesis will mostly use a qualitative approach, but there will be some quantitative budgetary 
data on defense expenditure in NATO (Collier 2011: 824). Process tracing applied in case 
studies is useful because it relates to the methods ability to identify the causal explanations. 
In comparison, statistical studies are better at measuring observed probability of an 
independent variable in measuring outcomes across a number of cases, which relates to the 
component of causal explanation defined as causal effects. Though for this paper, the effect 
will not be in focus, rather the causal explanation for the limited performance of capability 
initiatives in NATO (George and Bennett 2005:224).  
 
To sum up process tracing, it traces operations of causal mechanisms in action in a given 
situation. It allows the researcher to map the process and explore the extent to which it 
coincides with prior theoretical derived expectations about how the mechanisms work 
(Checkel 2008:116). 
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2.2.4 Interviews 
Checker argue that the data for process tracing is overwhelmingly qualitative in nature, and 
that it may include different sources such as, surveys, interviews, press accounts and 
documents (Checkel 2008: 116). As one of the qualitative data that are needed in this thesis, 
and in order to capture the interactions or the causal mechanisms, semi-structured interviews 
was conducted. They were conducted both over telephone and by mail correspondence, and 
the interviewees were selected through the use of snowball sampling. This is a method that 
samples through referrals among those who have special knowledge on the subject. The 
method is appropriate where it requires knowledge from insiders (Biernacki and Waldorf 
1981: 141).  
 
The interviewees are key persons with special knowledge on the subject. One of the issues 
here is the generality of the data provided from this method. There may be bias in the 
sampling, which compromises the good cross section from the population (Biernacki and 
Waldorf 1981: 160). The purpose of the interviews, however, is only to inform the primary 
and secondary data. Information from these interviews help shed light on issues that are not 
covered in official documents and research articles. When conducting a semi-structured 
interview, there is a list of questions or the topics that are under study, which is referred to an 
interview guide1 . The questions were asked either over telephone or e-mail, and the 
interviewees had a great deal of leeway in the replies. This makes the interviews flexible and 
preferable for this thesis. Some of the questions was different from each interview, but was 
similar in the wording (Bryman 2012: 471). 
 
There are some issues that have to be noted, such as the comments that were acquired over e-
mail and those over telephone. These methods are not as optimal as personal interviews, but 
considering the circumstances it is better than having no interviews at all. They were asked 
somewhat the same questions, though with different wording depending on the nationality of 
the interviewee. The interviewees were allowed to approve the comments before publishing. 
Despite of these issues, however, it is important to note that the purpose of these interviews is 
to inform the primary and secondary data, to fill the gaps where there is little documentation 
available. The Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services (NSD) has approved this project.2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Illustrative interview guide can be found in Appendix B 
2 Project number: 37952 
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2.2.5 Validity of the study 
As noted, the thesis uses a case study approach with process tracing and triangulation of data. 
When conducting such studies there are several concerns on the internal and external validity 
that has to be considered. These concerns relate to identifying causal relationships, making 
inferences and the issues with generalization.  
 
First, the internal validity of a case study poses as a concern if the researcher incorrectly 
concludes that there is a causal relationship between an event X that led to event Y, without 
taking a possible third factor into consideration. If not dealt with, there will be threats to the 
internal validity of the study. Though, with case studies as this, it is possible to have an in-
depth research on the case. This allows identifying factors that may have influenced the 
outcome. Compared with a quantitative study of NATO, this would be more difficult. It 
would have difficulties in identifying the causal mechanisms that influences specific 
outcome. Applying process tracing in this thesis allow identifying causal mechanisms that 
affect decision-making behavior in NATO. The second concern with internal validity in a 
case study is the problem of making inferences. When an event cannot directly be observed, 
the case study will “infer” that a specific event resulted from some earlier occurrence, based 
on the evidence collected. If the inference problem is taken into consideration, however, the 
case study has begun to deal with the problem of internal validity (Yin 2009: 42–43). 
 
External validity has been one of the major problems of conducting case studies. These 
criticisms generally state that single cases provide a limited basis for generalization. They 
often come while contrasting it to survey research, where the sample seeks to generalize to a 
larger universe. Robert K. Yin argues that this analogy is incorrect when dealing with case 
studies. Survey research does statistical generalization, while case study rely on analytic 
generalization. In analytic generalization the researcher generalize a particular set of results 
to a broader theory (Yin 2009:43). 
 
Using case study for this thesis allow achieving high levels of conceptual validity. It can 
identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concept chosen. Since 
many variables may be difficult to measure, the researcher must carry out contextualized 
comparison that seeks to address the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically 
equivalent phenomena across different contexts. As opposed to statistical study that has the 
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risk of conceptual stretching, case study allow conceptual refinements with a higher level of 
validity with few cases (George and Bennett 2005:19).  
 
The limits of case studies, however is that it can only make tentative conclusions on the 
degree of a variable will affect the outcome. In identifying the scope of conditions of 
theories, however, the case study is stronger. It can assess arguments about causal necessity 
or sufficiency in cases (George and Bennett 2005:25). By involving many observations in the 
study, the problem of making incorrect inferences is reduced. This thesis outlines the scope 
of which the theories will be used and at which level of analysis. Also, by involving several 
initiatives and reform processes, there will be more likely to reduce the threat of making 
incorrect inferences (Ibid: 32). 
 
To sum up, some of the issues with qualitative research is that is difficult to replicate, there 
are problems of generalizations and often a lack of transparency. As noted, however, by the 
use of triangulation one reduces the threats of validity and reaching false conclusions in 
applying the different data, and using multiple sources in the data collection. These issues are 
taken into consideration, and the qualitative approach is still the preferred approach at 
analyzing past capability initiatives and Smart Defense (Bryman 2012: 405–406).  
 
2.3 Limitations of the study 
The research field on NATO is certainly vast, and there may be many relevant aspects to 
study reform processes in NATO. One possible approach would be to base the study on the 
Strategic Concepts. Another approach would be to focus on the relationship between NATO 
and EU that could be a factor that influence reform processes in NATO. A different approach 
could also be to look at the implications of the financial crisis, or the economic effects of 
NATO enlargement. 
 
Several of these aspects would contribute to explain the challenges for NATO and Smart 
Defense. For instance, one could have applied a detailed case study approach with a large 
theoretical framework3. This could be a suitable and fruitful approach to go in-depth on 
NATO reforms, but such an approach is highly detailed and too large for use in this thesis. As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 More on this see Thomas Risse – Kappen’s ”Cooperation among democracies” (Risse-Kappen 1997). 
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for capabilities, different states do have own capability programs, and thereby own incentives 
for contributions in the alliance. Conducting a case study on all of these members would have 
required 28 cases, in which would be difficult considering the limitations of the study. The 
research question points in a direction where a selection of capability initiatives is analyzed 
to shed light on the progress of the NATO Smart Defense initiative. 
 
The choice of focusing on certain capability initiatives, and not Strategic Concepts, is 
because capabilities are an integral part of a defense alliance and it is capabilities that make 
action possible. It defines the available options, so looking specifically on a batch of current 
and previous initiatives that deals with increasing the capabilities in NATO, is more fruitful 
for the analysis.  Furthermore, this is not an in-depth study of the implication of the financial 
crisis. Despite that the financial crisis has effected the alliance, the focus is at the long-time 
factors that has affected past initiative and on reform processes since the 1990’s. If certain 
EU structures or the recent financial crisis are considered relevant or important to this thesis, 
it will be pointed out. This thesis will not deal with predictions on the future of the Alliance. 
The goal is neither to point out a guilty party that made past attempts fail, and may hinder 
Smart Defense. The purpose of this thesis is to point out the relevant factors that has affected 
and may affect reform process in NATO. 
 
Another possible approach could also be to look at the individual level where some 
individuals may have some integral part in the explanation of reforms in NATO. It seems, 
however, that the factors on the inter-state and systemic level may explain more of the factors 
affecting reforms.  In addition, experience from crisis management operations that 
contributes to shape reforms, is another study thesis for itself. This thesis focus on the 
specific issues outlined. Therefore, experiences from operations such as ISAF and 
Afghanistan will be pointed out and used to shed light on the subject where relevant.  
 
Furthermore there may be areas that could have included more quantitative data on specific 
reforms and more interviews could have been conducted. Much of data on the 
implementation of the initiatives, however, are classified. This has made the data collection 
on some of the aspects of the initiatives difficult, but despite of these limitations the official 
documents and research articles together provide with insight on the initiative and reform 
processes. The interviewees here help shed light on aspects where documentation was 
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unavailable. As for the theoretical framework, the three perspectives on organizations are 
discrete and not overlapping, and if there is some intersecting, it will be pointed out. And 
other relevant aspects that areas that would be relevant for explaining reforms in NATO, but 
is not in focus in this thesis, will be pointed out. 
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3 Post-Cold War capabilities initiatives in 
NATO 
 
Over the past two decades, NATO has experienced major reforms that intended to prepare the 
Alliance to cope with changes in the European security environment. These reforms form an 
indispensable backdrop to the Smart Defense initiative, both in terms of what these reforms 
delivered, and in what they failed to achieve. The following chapter outlines attempts at 
capability reforms and relevant initiatives since 1990. The purpose is to assess the 
shortcomings in past attempts in order to identify and explain how the favorable conditions 
may speak to the progress of Smart Defense. The chapter focuses on the priorities, 
implementation process and the lessons learned from the initiatives to explain reform 
processes in NATO in a greater context. By focusing on three distinct, yet cumulative, reform 
agendas, namely the DCI and PCC, we can get an understanding of what affect reforms in 
NATO. This understanding may help speak of the progress of Smart Defense. Throughout the 
chapter, an important aspect is the link between reform processes and alliance politics. The 
reform processes is important to discuss in a perspective of political will, hegemonic 
pressure, and threat perception. 
 
3.1 NATO Command Structure after the Cold War 
At the London Summit of July 1990, NATO declared the end of the Cold War. At the Rome 
summit in November 1991 the Alliance released a New Strategic Concept to be implemented 
(Young 1997: 1). NATO intended with its New Strategic Concept to prepare the Alliance for 
the post-Cold War context.4 The strategic concept did not provide any detailed guidance for 
giving an improved form for the NATO command and control structures. Rather it called for 
establishing flexible command and control arrangements that could make crisis management 
and conflict prevention possible. This Strategic Concept and the following initiatives have led 
to substantial reorganization of alliance command and control arrangements (Johnsen 1997: 
9).  
 
At the time, there were two strategic commands, namely Allied Command Europe (ACE) and 
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), created in respectively 1951 and 1952. Together they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 To learn more on the 1991 Strategic Concept see “The Alliance New Strategic Concept” (NATO 1991).  
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streamlined the command structure after the end of the Cold war by reducing the NATO 
command structure from 78 headquarters to 20. The two overarching Strategic Commanders 
(SC) were maintained, one for the Atlantic area and one for Europe (NATO 2013b). 
 
Since then there have been many attempts at reforms, which opens up to the question of why 
there has been so many reforms? While the power- or burden-sharing challenges facing 
NATO have been discussed at length, other reorganizations in the military structures have 
received notably less attention. Among the significant changes, the Alliance eliminated one 
out of three Major NATO Commanders (MNC) and overhauled the ACE reducing its force 
structure by 40 percent. Following the decisions by foreign ministers at the Oslo ministerial 
in June 1992, the NATO military forces have taken upon new missions. The reorganized and 
smaller forces would have to conduct traditional Article 5 missions, as well as to contribute 
to what was referred to as non-Article 5 missions (Young 1997: 1–2). This happened against 
many expectations. Waltz, for example, argued that NATO would dwindle after the cold war 
and just disappear (Waltz 2000a: 19). In a neorealist view, international institutions, such as 
NATO, serves the interests of the states. It is created by powerful states and as long as it 
serves its interests, it will persevere. In order to survive NATO had to reform or suffer the 
same fate of the Warsaw pact (Ibid: 26).  
 
By 1994, the Alliance was reorganized to become more adaptive to the current security 
environment, but in the early period of the wars in Yugoslavia NATO found itself 
underprepared to deal with problems concerning crisis management operations. The rhetoric 
at the time emphasized peace and security in Europe, as well as NATO’s new missions. The 
U.S., however, was reluctant to become involved in European territory. At the time NATO 
still had a collective defense mindset and structure, and it had not exercised, planned, or 
practiced for nothing else than its Cold War mission with collective defense under Article 5. 
Both military and politically among the members, there was a reluctance to shed the NATO’s 
collective defense capabilities, structures, and missions for the uncharted world of non-
Article 5 missions (Wallander 2000: 718–719). 
 
The changed security environment required not only a simple reduction of commands, but 
also a shift in capacity and makeup. With non-Article 5 and out-of-area missions, NATO’s 
command structure and its forces needed to be more mobile. As a solution to these 
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challenges, the heads of state and government at the 1994 Brussels Summit created the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and approved the creation of the Combined Joint Task 
Forces concept (CJTF), with a mission-specific mobile command structure (Wallander 2000: 
719; Young 1997: 1).  
 
The function of CJTF was to provide the Alliance with flexible and efficient means to 
generate forces at short notice. It would provide NATO with rapidly deployable, 
multinational and multiservice task forces with appropriate command and control 
arrangements (NATO 1999a: 1). The concept would also reflect NATO’s readiness to make 
the alliances assets available for the members. It would be on the basis of case-by-case 
decisions decided in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), for operations led by the Western 
European Union (WEU). With this it would support building the European Security Defense 
Identity (ESDI). The CJTF concept would be linked to the development to the practical 
political and military cooperation with non-NATO nations (NATO 1999a: 1). Specifically, 
CJTF is a deployable force generated and tailored primarily for operations not involving the 
defense of territory. These military operations can include humanitarian relief and 
peacekeeping. This was one of the first significant reforms that put pressure on the Alliance 
military capabilities, and furthermore conditioned how the Alliance would operate the 
following years (NATO 1999a: 1).  
 
3.2 Burden-sharing and the purpose of the Alliance 
Since its inception, there have been several internal debates in NATO that has contributed to 
reform. This concerns mostly the burden-sharing debate and debate on the purpose of the 
Alliance. Over time it has emerged several gaps that has affected the ability to implement 
capability initiatives in NATO. For this thesis, there are especially three gaps that are 
important in explaining reform processes in NATO. One, the U.S. has from the beginning 
shouldered most of the burden in the Alliance, in which the U.S. itself and the other allies 
have been used to. Two, and relating to the first gap, the European allies has been used to 
having a disproportional weight in the Alliance with the U.S. as the hegemonic power. 
Finally, there are problems with interoperability between the European allies and the U.S., 
where since the 90’s, the U.S. technologically speaking have been one or two generations 
ahead of the other allies. These gaps can explain why U.S. emphasize the need for change 
and reform in NATO, and furthermore why there is no unity of willingness, both militarily 
  
 
33	  
and politically, to live up to all of the commitments outlined in capability initiatives. These 
issues derive from a long-time internal debate within the alliance, which will be outlined in 
this section. 
 
Starting with the burden-sharing debate, which has always been a part of NATO and 
contributed to several debates on organizational reform. This “transatlantic bargain” balances 
U.S. commitment against European contributions, which has proven durable since NATO’s 
inception. Europeans has expressed doubts on the reliability of the U.S. commitment, and 
Americans has expressed their dissatisfaction of the European contribution to the Alliance. 
The burden-sharing arrangement has been imprecise since the Alliance inception, which is 
not unusual in international diplomacy. Events that arose, however, would bring up this 
division of the burden between the U.S. and the European NATO members (Cooper and 
Zycher 1989: 2). 
 
The burden-sharing debate, as well as the issues that led to previous reforms, is still relevant 
in regards to reform processes in NATO today. The debate intensified with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. As the members expected a “peace dividend”, most of the allies during the 
1990’s underwent drastic cuts in their armed forces and defense budgets. In the period from 
1989 to 2000 the U.S. halved its defense spending from 6 % to 3 % of GDP. The five largest 
European allies (UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) cut their defenses in the same period 
from 3.1 % to 2%. As a consequence the gap in defense spending in the Alliance narrowed 
(Hallams and Schreer 2012: 315). 
 
With the strategic environment of the mid-1990s, there was no longer a threat of a full-scale 
simultaneous attack on all fronts in Europe, and the focus was no longer on defending 
national territory. Now the focus was on power-projection as well as rapid reaction and 
mobile forces that were able to operate outside NATO territory. Allies reducing its defense 
budgets and thinning its forces is relevant if the Alliance were to do interventions in different 
regions of the world. In these circumstances, burden-sharing debate is likely to re-emerge 
(Hartley and Sandler 1999: 667–668). This was the case with the U.S. led intervention in Iraq 
in 1990-1991, where the burden-sharing debate became relevant again. This intervention 
indicated a widening gap in military capabilities in the Alliance, which became more evident 
in the engagement in the Balkans. It revealed deficiencies in European nations, as they were 
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unable to resolve the crisis without U.S. diplomatic and military power. Here the U.S. would 
stand back as European allies placed considerable troops at risk in the early period of the 
Bosnia crisis. Eventually, U.S. led the NATO intervention in Bosnia, only after the Alliance 
was tested to the limits. In Bosnia, NATO was the key institution to help consolidate the 
peace (Kay 2013:104; Hallams and Schreer 2012: 316). 
 
In addition to the burden-sharing debate, the issue of the Alliance political and military 
purpose has also created debates. The debate on the purpose of NATO traces back to the 
1967 Harmel Report. The Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance articulated the 
balance between NATO’s military and its political function. This report was the first effort to 
develop a common political strategy for NATO. The report was often referred to as the 
“Magna Carta” of NATO and defined the “ultimate political purpose” of the Alliance. 
Among many of the distinctions, the Report made clear that NATO would pursue a policy of 
détente, with the explicit aim of deescalating East-West rivalry (Østerud and Toje 2013: 76). 
 
Worth mentioning from the report are for example Paragraph 5, which carried a vision of 
détente. What this meant is that a balance of force would contribute to create a stable, secure 
and confident environment. The dual approach of credible collective defense, combined with 
cohabitation with the Eastern bloc, was to be continued into the post-Cold War period. For 
future issues Paragraph 9 stated that the Alliance ultimate political purpose is to achieve a 
just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees. 
This is a goal that remains unchained today. On the global role of NATO, Paragraph 15 
stated that: “The North Atlantic Treaty Area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the 
world. Crisis and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or 
by affecting the global balance”. This was to maintain new relevance when the threat that it 
had been created to avert disappeared (Østerud and Toje 2013: 76). 
 
There are two important elements of the Harmel Report. One, it committed NATO to follow 
a dual approach. The Alliance accepted that military defense and deterrence must be balanced 
by committing to political détente. This was of great importance for Europeans, because they 
were aware that if tensions between superpowers failed to be defused, any conflict could 
potentially lead to the destruction of their countries. Two, the security guarantees alone was 
not enough, and the Alliance had to come up with a collective foreign policy (Hill and Smith 
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2002: 68). The two elements continued to have great importance trough the Cold War, and 
the very existence of the Harmel Report helped Europeans realize that there were limitations 
to the extent to which NATO could genuinely be a multilateral forum. For one this is because 
of U.S. domination, and for the other it is because a military alliance is an unwieldy and static 
organization. This is an important reminder because such organizations are rarely capable of 
flexible or proactive policy-making. The Harmel Report was therefore a stage in what have 
been a gradual self-realization of European foreign policy cooperation (Ibid).  
 
At the 1967 meeting, the allies adopted the Report, and in this bold stroke fundamentally 
changed the objective, image and future task of NATO. The combination of defense and 
détente provided with intellectual and political framework for the alliance, which 
accommodated the growing split in the alliance between left and right. As Sloan argue, by 
bridging the two different views of the East – West political-military situation, the Report 
broadened the potential base of support for NATO. Subsequently, the Alliance could serve as 
a fulcrum for balancing divergent perspectives on the requirements for the West’s security 
policy in Europe, instead of providing a focus for polarization among western politicians 
(Sloan 1985: 45).  
 
NATO’s purpose has been and is to date still contested. The overall rationale for NATO, 
however, is an entirely different discussion. How the Alliance has changed its purpose and 
the burden-sharing issue, on the other hand, is important in the discussion of how reform 
occurs. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO faced challenges of transforming its 
raison d’être. One of the challenges was the decision of how to relate to former Soviet states. 
The other was redefining its Strategic Concept and changing its mode of operation. The Cold 
War legacy made these challenges more difficult. Despite a half a century of debate of the 
burden-sharing problem, the Alliance has proven incapable of generating equal sharing of the 
defense burden. This problem was for one compounded by a growing gap in technology and 
military capabilities that limited the interoperability. Two, much of the same situation was 
reflected in the power-sharing problem within the Alliance. Here the U.S. had grown 
accustomed to holding a hegemonic position. Three, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
NATO was left without a common enemy to justify its policies. Without an agreed purpose, 
the future was unclear for the Alliance (Østerud and Toje 2013: 77). 
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The 1991 Strategic Concept was revised in 1999 following the conflict in the Balkans. It was 
revised to reflect the new security situation in Europe. What the 1999 Strategic Concept 
failed to deliver was a clear purpose of the Alliance. The lack of a clear and present threat 
undercut the strategic aspects. Cooperation with former Soviet states was important in order 
to improve the security in Europe, and the Alliance forces could be scaled down at the same 
time as mobility and adaptability to new situations were to be increased. This was a response 
to the U.S. position that Senator Richard Lugar in 1993 argued that NATO had to go “out of 
area or out of business”. With the new Strategic Concept, NATO’s traditional Article 5 
collective defense role was still necessary but not sufficient to underpin the Alliance purpose. 
Therefore, the Alliance was redefined as an instrument with a dual role of crisis management 
within and beyond the collective defense area (Rhodes 2013: 40; Østerud and Toje 2013: 78–
79). 
 
The first decade of the new century, NATO was faced with the challenge of becoming over-
burdened. This problem was a consequence of the unclear definition of the major tasks. There 
was also a wide array of challenges, either potential or imminent, that was elevated to the 
level of threat. When the Strategic Concept was again revised in 2010, the tripartite function 
of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security was addressed. To add to 
this tripartite function, the Alliance included tasks such as fighting terrorism, organized crime 
and piracy. As a consequence, the threat perception became wider, less focused and more 
controversial. Now NATO’s tasks were about collective defense and out-of-areas activities. 
This resulted in a political impasse, which translated into decreased defense spending 
(Østerud and Toje 2013: 79). 
 
With changing purpose and missions, the burden-sharing debate and the purpose of the 
Alliance is still relevant today, which leads up to the last series of defense reforms. The 
Defense Capabilities Initiative and Prague Capabilities Commitment were measures to 
narrow the gap between U.S. and European members. The lessons learned from past 
experience and what they can say about the progress of Smart Defense will be discussed 
later. 
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3.3 The Defense Capabilities Initiative 
3.3.1 Priorities 
When the Cold War ended, NATO had to reassess its collective defense strategy. Experience 
from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia showed that NATO structures was unsuited to 
handling contemporary challenges, notably crisis management operations. It was deemed that 
forces needed to be lighter and more mobile and technological equality between the U.S. and 
its allies to allow for greater interoperability (Ek 2001: 1). According to the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD) the European allies were particularly weak in areas such as precision 
strike, mobility and command and control and communications (C3), and a lack of sufficient 
strategic lift and aircraft intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. There were also a lack 
of an efficient doctrinal and technical interoperability that posed as further challenges 
(Hagman 2002: 15). As a response to these tendencies, at the Washington Summit in April 
1999, NATO Heads of State and Government NATO launched the Defense Capabilities 
Initiative (DCI) (Ek 2001: 1). 
 
The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept of 1999 sought to highlight challenges NATO faced at 
present time and in the future. There was the need to maintain capabilities in order to deal 
with large-scale aggression against one or more of the members. The probability of this 
occurring in the foreseeable future was however low. The Strategic Concept emphasized that 
potential threats to alliance security were more likely to result from regional conflicts, ethnic 
strife or other crises beyond alliance territory. This included the proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The DCI was central in meeting these 
challenges (NATO 1999b). 
 
The goal of DCI was to enable the Alliance to deploy their troops quickly to crisis regions, to 
supply and protect these forces, and to equip the in order to engage their adversary 
effectively. With DCI, NATO wanted to improve the Alliance’s ability to fulfill its traditional 
collective defense commitments, and prepare the Alliance to meet emerging security 
challenges (Ek 2001: 1-2). The goal was to improve the defense capabilities to ensure the 
effectiveness of future multinational operations across all of the Alliance missions in the 
present and foreseeable security environment. The focus was therefore on improving 
interoperability among Alliance forces (NATO 1999b).  
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NATO itself describe the initiative as having: 
 
“(…) a special focus on interoperability, DCI is concentrating on the deployability and 
mobility of forces, on their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective 
engagement capability, and on consultation, command and control” (NATO 1999c). 
 
As Julian Lindley-French argue, DCI was launched not only to prepare the European allies 
for the challenges ahead, but it was also an American test of European seriousness. The 
initiative involved the focus areas as described above, and 58 separate goals (Lindley-French 
2007: 85). Of these goals a number were seen as easy to accomplish, delivering additional 
capabilities relatively quickly at low costs. Coordination, cooperation and training objectives 
fell within this category. The DCI was also seen as a mechanism for increasing the 
interoperability in operations concerning peace-support. A majority of the goals were 
applicable to NATO partners and were channeled to the PfP planning and review process 
(Hagman 2002: 16). 
 
The Alliance’s military operations, including non - Article 5 crisis response operations, were 
likely to be in a smaller scale than those of which were basis for Alliance planning during the 
Cold War. At the time the prediction was that these operations would be longer in duration, 
they would extend the multinational cooperation to lower levels, and take place concurrently 
with other Alliance operations. Operations outside Alliance territory had the probability to be 
undertaken with no, or only limited, access to existing NATO infrastructure. It was predicted 
that it would not be possible to invoke existing national emergency legislation to provide 
civilian transport assets for deployment or to mobilize reserves (NATO 1999b). As stated by 
NATO on the DCI:  
 
“These developments will make new demands on the capabilities required of Alliance forces, 
in particular in the field of interoperability. It is important that all nations are able to make a 
fair contribution to the full spectrum of Alliance missions regardless of differences in national 
defence structures” (NATO 1999b). 
 
At the time, there was significant progress in adapting Alliance forces to the requirement of 
the new security environment. Many of the allies only had relatively limited capabilities for 
the rapid deployment of significant forces outside national territory, or for extended 
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sustainment of operations and protection of forces far from home bases. This brought out the 
need for the command and control and information systems, to be better matched to the 
requirements of future Alliance military operations. This would entail the exchange of a 
greater volume of information end extending to lower levels than in the past (NATO 1999b).  
 
3.3.2 Implementing the DCI 
From experience in the Balkans, the DCI highlighted the importance of interoperable 
communications that ideally would facilitate command, control, and information systems 
among NATO allies, making them able to effectively work coherently. The DCI was 
intended to dramatically improve NATO’s response time to international crises with a focus 
on advancement of new defense capabilities (Ivanov 2011: 122). In order to oversee the 
implementation of the DCI, the Heads of State and Government agreed at the Washington 
summit to establish a temporary High Level Steering Group (HLSG), with a 2 – year 
program of work. The HLSG would work on the implementation, while the NATO staff and 
committee would focus on moving the DCI forward. In order to be successful, DCI depended 
on the collective effort by the Alliance and the resources provided by the individual members 
(NATO 1999c).  
 
The HLSG was also established to influence priorities, and coordinate as well as integrate the 
efforts of the numerous NATO committees and bodies involved. This included force 
planning, with NATO standardization, with the aim of achieving lasting effects on 
improvements in capabilities and interoperability (NATO 1999b). It was important for the 
Alliance that the DCI succeeded, especially in a time when there have been identified 
persistent shortfalls among the European allies, and with the interoperability between the 
European allies internally, and between Europe and the U.S.  
 
The success however depended on several factors, which was discussed by the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly in 2000. They stated that the implementation would ultimately 
“depend on the resources allocated by national governments and parliaments to defence and 
on the ability to optimize their use” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2000). They noted that 
some of the allies had begun the restructuring of the armed forces so that they more 
effectively could carry out the roles and missions identified in the 1999 Strategic Concept 
(Ibid).  
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This was considered a step in the right direction because: 
  
“Moving away from heavy, static forces devoted to territorial defence and reliant on 
conscripts will achieve some savings. As a result, restructuring and redirecting existing 
defence budgets can help countries develop the capabilities identified by the DCI; however, 
there might be a need for some countries to increase defence appropriations in this major 
transition phase” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2000). 
 
For the allies a very large portion of the national activity was directed towards the 
implementation of DCI where it fell under the area of the NATO defense planning system. 
The annual Defense Review 1999 showed that the there was a strong DCI focus in many of 
the member countries, and the Force Goals 2000, which were under preparation at that time, 
and had a goal to further DCI improvements (NATO 1999b). 
 
3.3.3 Lessons learned 
Looking at the progress of the DCI, what lessons can be learned from the initiative? First of 
all, with the new approach, the goal of the DCI was to create a crisis management capability 
while maintaining Article 5 capability, a tall order at a time when NATO came to be known 
as the “threatless alliance”.5 The nations reduced its budgets on their own and already there 
were indications that the Alliance is unable to do both crisis management and Article 5, or at 
least not capable. It emerged a gap between ambitions and institutional military realities. The 
emphasis was moved from a multinational character of the Alliance’s forces, towards the 
capacity to act as a single unit within a responsive and coherent alliance. The new forces 
were to maintain and supply activities away from their bases at home, while at the same time 
survive and effectively engage in long-term operations. DCI emphasized development of new 
defense capabilities that was intended to improve NATO’s response time to international 
crises. The shift from CJTF to DCI shows a pattern of an evolution from peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement to more advanced capabilities designed to respond to, and prevent, 
international crises (Ivanov 2011: 122–123).  
 
The capabilities outlined in DCI was designed to make NATO troops able to successfully 
engage in crisis management operations, as well as protect the forces and infrastructure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 More on this see Asle Toje’s ”America, the EU and Strategic Culture” (Toje 2009: 89). 
  
 
41	  
against current and future threats. When the initial reports of the implementation progress 
came in, the mood in the Alliance was encouraging, and the prospects for further capability 
improvements were good. Later the same year of its implementation, NATO officials were 
satisfied with the initial results, both within NATO and in national programs. Still, they 
expressed that it would take more vigorous efforts to implement the DCI fully. In this 
process, the HLSG’s role was to monitor the overall progress and initiate corrective or 
supportive action where that appeared necessary (NATO 1999b; NATO 1999d). 
 
As time passed however, the prospects were less encouraging. When DCI was launched, EU 
was preoccupied with building its monetary union. Reports of the progress in early 2000, 
turned therefore out to be discouraging. The Pentagons verdict was that “the information so 
far available does not provide a sufficiently comprehensive picture of national 
implementation activities”. Although there were “hopeful signs of movement towards 
increased defense spending,” whereas France, Germany, and the Netherlands was making 
efforts in areas such as pooling civilian and military lift, there was “unresponsive defense 
budgets continue to erode Alliance capabilities” (Borawski and Young 2001: 11). 
 
Borawski and Young argue that the limited progress is a consequence of the inability of non 
– U.S. members to find the necessary funding and make the required investment to 
modernize its forces. Because the allies were comfortable and was used to U.S. protection, 
the allies was not willing to invest in the initiative. This revealed a collective action problem 
within the Alliance, where defense in Europe has become a public good provided by the U.S., 
and enables free-riding by smaller allies (Borawski and Young 2001: 10). Therefore, in June 
2001, there was an uneven progress where NATO’s own internal assessment on the initiative 
identified “critical and longstanding deficiencies” in many capability areas (UK Parliament 
2008: 44). Arguably, the national interpretations of the initiative varied. Most Eastern 
European NATO members perceived it as a long-term project that would be dealt with after 
they had adapted their own forces. This was a process that would be expected to take ten 
years or more. As Hagman argues, the DCI was directed primarily at the larger NATO allies, 
that being UK, France and Germany. This is because most of the elements in the initiative 
demands large amount of resources, in sense being expensive, involving advanced 
technology or take certain degree of interoperability for granted (Hagman 2002: 16–17). 
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In a press statement on the DCI issued at the meeting of the NAC in Defense Ministers 
session held in Brussels, they stated that despite the progress in certain areas, further effort 
were required in order to achieve necessary improvements. The critical and long-standing 
deficiencies existed in the areas of effective engagement and survivability of alliance forces. 
This was in the areas of “suppression of enemy air defense and support jamming; combat 
identification; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (including the Alliance Ground 
Surveillance system); air weapons systems for day/night and all weather operations; air 
defence in all its aspects, including against theatre ballistic missiles and cruise missiles” and 
last but not least “capabilities against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and 
their means of delivery, and NBC detection and protection” (NATO 2001). 
 
What explains the limited progress in the implementation of the DCI initiative? Some of the 
lessons learned from the DCI were that it was struck among competing priorities. In order for 
it to work, the member states would have to allocate the additional resources for defense and 
spend more wisely. By so doing, the agreed NATO Force Goals were not only to be 
declaratory, and the potential for actually bolstering the capabilities for the Alliance would 
had more chance of being realized. This, however, did not happen (Borawski and Young 
2001: 13).  
 
The DCI initiative was designed to address the growing technological gap between US and 
its NATO allies, and the strategic disengagement of Europe and the U.S. and declining 
European defense budgets and procurement. The proposed solution was increased European 
defense spending and off-the-shelf procurement of capabilities. However by late 2002, there 
had been limited progress in US and European perceptions of capabilities (Hagman 2002: 
15). In this regard, Hagman argues that the perception of the DCI both in France and 
Germany was that it was a US “shopping list”. Not least since the only way to acquire 
quickly new and advanced combat systems was to by them off-the-shelf, which essentially 
meant buying American equipment (Ibid: 17). The U.S. thus overestimated the European 
willingness to spend on defense. Arguably, it was a unilateral decision, with a lack of 
consultation from the U.S., and with a wide range of costs that the Europeans deemed too 
expensive.  
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The U.S. encouragement of European members taking responsibility and develop their 
military capabilities, received muted response in Europe. The U.S., being the largest 
contributor in the Alliance, has substantial interests in having the European taking some of 
the burden. Therefore, there were hegemonic pressures in getting the DCI through. For the 
European allies there was not an option in increasing defense expenditures or signing on to 
expensive procurement goals that did not benefit domestic employment or growth. Another 
problem is that the U.S. has a clear conception of current threats and what they mean in terms 
of capabilities. For most European allies however, this perception has not changed since the 
1990s (Hagman 2002: 29–30). 
 
Compared with Europe, the U.S. maintained its defense spending, U.S. interests and U.S. 
global commitments and ambitions. The problem was that domestic politics came in the way 
in whatever initiatives the U.S. came up with to its NATO allies. The national parliaments or 
governments determine defense spending and national procurement. Consequently, domestic 
politics shape how nations focus on defense spending (Hagman 2002: 30). Former NATO 
Secretary General Robertson argued that the allies had to invest more wisely, where the 
technological gap became more evident. He argued that “whereas in the past, technological 
innovation was something that helped us work effectively together, today technology is 
moving so fast that some of NATO’s members are at least in danger of being left behind” 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2000).  The issue here was that Europeans hesitated to buy U.S. 
made material in areas such as strategic airlift, communications and precision-guided 
munitions because this offered little benefit for European defense industries. The U.S. off-
the-shelf alternatives would have to be used, but there was reluctance, even if they were more 
advanced and readily available (Hagman 2002: 30). 
 
Therefore the progress and new capabilities that NATO wished for, worked against itself and 
limited progress was made. After a Defense Ministers session in 2002, the North Atlantic 
Council issued a press release stating that the progress made in implementing the DCI, and 
that there is necessary with a more focused effort. Furthermore, they stated that they had 
“directed the Council in Permanent Session to prepare recommendations for a new 
capabilities initiative, taking into account military advice and national proposals”. They 
argued that this should focus on a small number of capabilities that are essential to the full 
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spectrum of missions and that it will also “strengthen our capabilities for defence against 
terrorism” (NATO 2002a). On the new capabilities, they stated that: 
  
“The capabilities should contribute to the Alliance’s ability to: defend against chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear attacks; ensure the command communications and 
information superiority; improve interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of 
combat effectiveness; and ensure rapid deployment and sustainment of combat forces” 
(NATO 2002a). 
 
Because of the limited progress, the Alliance had to reduce the level of ambition by rethink 
and downsizing the lust of objectives. By 2002 they were already outlining a new capability 
initiative that would solve the deficiencies observed in the DCI. They emphasize importance 
in capability initiatives because it poses an opportunity to potentially save a substantial 
amount of money on joint procurement. Still, in order for a new initiative to work, it had to 
overcome challenges such as hegemonic pressures from the U.S. combined with reluctance 
from European allies, problems of domestic politics, and different threat perception. The 
critical deficiencies in all of these areas implies that the progress of the DCI was very limited, 
and that it would take greater effort, both politically and militarily, in pooling the resources to 
bolster the capabilities.  
 
3.4 Prague Capabilities Commitment 
3.4.1 Priorities 
Due to limited progress of DCI, the Heads of State and Government approved the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment (PCC) at the Prague Summit in 2002 (NATO 2002b). In the PCC 
initiative the member states made specific political commitments to improve their capabilities 
in several areas. As written in the Prague Summit declaration it would improve capabilities in 
the areas of: 
 
“Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance, and 
target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; 
combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air 
defences; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and 
combat service support units” (NATO 2002b). 
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With the PCC, NATO sought to address the perceived problems of the DCI and improve 
members operational capabilities, in order cope with evolving defense needs. The PCC 
initiative was by analysts regarded as an attempt to resuscitate DCI, which had been 
perceived as too broad and diffuse. The PCC calls for Alliance members to make further 
commitments to bolster their capabilities in different areas, and it places greater emphasis on 
multinational commitments as well as pooling of funds. PCC differed from the DCI in several 
regards. In light of the security threat that emerged on September 11, the PCC intended to 
improve the DCI. In an effort to combat terrorism, it emphasized air lift, secure 
communications, Precision Guided Munition’s (PGM), and protection against Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) (Ek 2007: 3).  
 
More specifically, there were three areas the initiative differed. One, the PCC were more 
focused than the DCI, and clarified what the requirement was in order to bolster the Alliance 
defense capabilities. Two, it was a considerable political pressure in making PCC successful. 
As John Shimkus argues in his report, “it was conceived at a NATO summit and carries the 
weight of a summit declaration, something that the previous attempts lacked. This indicates a 
level of “buy-in” at the top political levels and gives the PCC a higher profile” (Shimkus 
2005: 2). Despite the differences between the two initiatives, the rhetoric and principles 
remained broadly similar. They both emphasized the need for pooling the resources, 
increasing interoperability and deployability. Though, where the DCI was more diffuse in its 
goals, the PCC sought out to be more specific in order to deal with the perceived problems 
with the previous initiatives. The third area that the PCC differed is that it benefited from a 
high level of cooperation between groups of individual allies who organize themselves to 
share assets and development costs. Doing this makes the necessary assets more affordable 
than previous attempts at defense capabilities improvement (Ibid: 2-3).  
 
At the Prague summit, the PCC was not the only initiative that was launched. The Prague 
summit, known as the “transformation summit”, adopted three core decisions, which outlined 
the coming reforms in NATO. First was the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), 
which was formally approved. The NRF constituted a new type of standing expeditionary 
force of 20 000 troops which could be quickly deployed and sustained for 30 days. Second, 
as mentioned, the Alliance formally endorsed the PCC, where it entailed specific 
commitments from the individual members and coalition to invest in new capabilities. Third, 
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the Alliance also decided to open its door and with this invited seven small countries from 
Eastern Europe to join NATO (Ivanov 2011: 123). The PCC initiative came parallel to 
NATO enlargement, in which posed demands on increased funding to take new members in6. 
Because some allies had to pay these expenditures, it contributes to a widening of the gap 
between the members.  
 
As Ivan Dinev Ivanov argue, the summit marked a milestone in NATO’s overall reform 
effort (Ivanov 2011: 123). The need to support the new missions that NATO has taken upon 
itself, contributed to the decisions to introduce new multinational forces. What PCC outlined 
was a mechanism to managing NATO’s diverging interests and interoperability. This by 
ensuring that all of the members, old as new, would have to work closely with each other in 
order to complement their capabilities. The summit therefore launched new NATO forces 
that would better serve the requirements for crisis response. This would ensure that troops 
would be able to move more quickly and further, by applying military force more effectively 
and sustaining extended combat in NATO operations (Ibid).  
 
The NRF can be considered an initiative with a goal of strengthen Alliance capabilities 
through establishing a quickly deployable response force. Formally it was announced at the 
Prague Summit in November 2002. Ministers of Defense approved it in June 2003 in 
Brussels, and at NATO’s Riga Summit in November 2006. From here the NRF was declared 
to be fully ready to undertake active operations. The NRF would be a highly ready and 
technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special 
Forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed (NATO 2013c). 
 
NRF contributed to the reformation of an integral part of the PCC. It was intended to solve 
the problems related to efficiency, interoperability, and coordination created by the CJTF’s. 
This reaction force would provide the Alliance with an robust and credible capacity to 
quickly and efficiently react to international crises (Ivanov 2011: 124). It would function as a 
joint multinational force, where the need of each crisis response mission would determine the 
size of the force, and it was expected to acquire certain military assets. Compared to the 
CJTF, the NRF combines ”high-readiness” forces with CJTFs in order to better integrate 
NATO’s command and force structures. This would enhance the deployability, sustainability, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 More on NATO enlargement see “NATO Enlargement – Close to the end?” (Dunay 2013).  
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and fighting capability of the troops given the operational environment they may encounter 
(Ibid).  
 
Regarding the contribution from the allies, NRF was designed to distribute the military 
burden equitably among different Alliance members. This would avoid increasing the 
capability gaps between the allies. Early in the implementation of the NRF, it would provide 
exclusively enhanced peacekeeping capabilities, and after it had developed, the NRF would 
perform crisis prevention and response tasks. In essence, the response force implemented 
would be composed of troops from several allies where they contribute with forces (Ivanov 
2011: 124).   
 
Since its establishment, the NRF has been adjusted several times in order to be more flexible 
in force generation, by facilitating force contributions which were being hampered by the 
high operational tempo from Iraq, Afghanistan and other missions. To further support force 
generation, allies set themselves voluntary national targets for force contributions (NATO 
2013c).  
 
3.4.2 Implementing the PCC 
In the Prague Summit declaration it was noted that the implementation process would have to 
happen quickly. The implementation of the aspects of PCC was highly prioritized and the 
importance of making the necessary steps to improve the capabilities in the identified areas of 
continuing capability shortfalls was to be taken. The steps included multinational efforts, role 
specialization and reprioritization. In these steps it was noted that additional financial 
resources was required, subject as appropriate to parliamentary approval. With this the 
Council in Permanent Session is directed to report on implementation to Defense Ministers 
(NATO 2002b). 
 
Like the DCI, the implementation of the PCC was monitored on a regular basis. Each country 
had to report on the progress on the implementation of the commitments, along with 
explanations of any divergence from the items it has pledged to fulfill (Ek 2007: 3).  
Formally, each year through 2008 the Secretary of Defense would have to submit to the 
congressional committees a report on the implementation progress on the PCC initiative by 
the member nations of the NATO. In order to further the shortcomings in the implementation 
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of the PCC, the report would include, among many points, a description of the action taken 
by NATO itself and by each nation other than the US. This included any action taken to 
improve capability shortfalls in the areas identified for improvement. They would also report 
on a discussion of the relationship between NATO efforts to improve capabilities through the 
PCC. This included the EU so that European capabilities could be enhanced through the 
European Capabilities Action Plan, including the extent to which they are mutually 
reinforcing (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2006: 798–799). 
 
Although most of the reports on the progress of PCC remain classified, which make it 
difficult to assess the implementation progress of PCC because of incomplete information. 
Mainly this is a result of transparency on force goals of member states. The 2005 NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly report, however, made some tentative judgments in several areas 
that gave some indication of the implementation of the PCC. First, it stated that that the 
sealift, CBRN and the process of equipping aircraft with PGM’s were on track. Although the 
development of European PGM capabilities had been complicated by U.S. reluctance to share 
sensitive technology and encryption codes (Ek 2007: 5). 
 
In addition to the initiative, at the 2002 Prague summit, the NATO’s military command 
structure was reorganized with a focus of becoming leaner and more efficient. The Allied 
Command Europe (ACE) became Allied Command Operations (ACO) (NATO 2013d). In 
addition to this, in order to successfully implement the commitments in the PCC, Allied 
Command Transformation was created with the focus on transforming NATO. As a 
consequence of the reform, there was a significant reduction in HQs and Combined Air 
Operations Centers. It was reduced from 32 to 9, and this reflected a fundamental shift in 
alliance thinking (NATO 2013d). 
 
3.4.3 Lessons Learned 
By assessing the priorities and the progress made in PCC, what lessons can we derive from 
the PCC initiative? For one, because NATO operates under a consensus rule, and the fact that 
the Alliance adopted the PCC implies that all member states agreed to the need to strengthen 
capabilities of an expeditionary nature. Despite this, some critics are skeptical of the possible 
motives behind the push for more advanced capabilities. They argue that a massive increase 
in defense spending is unnecessary and wasteful and that PCC merely serves to boost sales 
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for high – technology arms and equipment manufacturers. Others argue that the capabilities 
gap between the U.S. and its NATO allies is an important factor of the limited progress in the 
implementation (Ek 2007 :6). 
 
Among many of the goals, what the PCC generated was significant and successful in two 
regards. The first was pooling of jointly owned and operated support jamming pods to use in 
electronic warfare, air-to-air refueling fleet and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). The 
second was for Europe, the acquisition of aircrafts. Even with some success, however, the 
goals formulated in the PCC were difficult to materialize in full. The resources required to 
successfully reach the goals outlined in the PCC were substantial, which the European 
defense budgets could not sustain (Hagman 2002: 31–32). 
 
In NATO’s publications and statements, Carl Ek argues that by reading between the lines, 
you could find that there were real improvements in boosting capabilities. An example of this 
is the June 2005 meeting, where the NATO defense ministers issued a communiqué stating 
that PCC had “brought some improvements in capabilities, but critical deficiencies persist 
particularly in support for our deployed forces.” One year later however, the Ministers 
statement was more optimistic, noting progress in a number of areas and indicating that they 
had “provided further guidance on the way ahead” (Ek 2007: 5). Not long before the Riga 
summit, NATO issued a media summit guide that stated that of the 460 PCC commitments, 
over 70 percent would have been fulfilled, and most of the remaining would be completed by 
2009 and beyond (Ibid). 
 
In a report on the progress of the PCC, experience from Afghanistan in International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) has shown both positive and negative results in the implementation 
process of the PCC. John Shimkus reports that ISAF commanders have told visiting 
delegations from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly that there is a lack of sufficient 
capability in critical areas such as air transport, and especially helicopters (Shimkus 2005: 
15). Experience revealed that the deficiencies in providing capabilities were not because of a 
lack of helicopters. It was because of an unwillingness to take the expense of sending them to 
where they are needed. A critical point with this, which Shimkus points out, is that the 
progress of fulfilling the commitments in initiatives such as the PCC does not matter if there 
is no political will of deploying them where they are needed (Ibid). This may indicate a 
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paradox that has occurred in the Alliance. Meaning that there is a tension between the 
willingness to living up to the commitments, and the lack of political will to actually use the 
acquired assets. 
 
In this regard an important question is why the PCC, like the DCI, are having difficulties in 
making the members living up to the capability commitments? When the DCI was launched, 
a combination of peace dividend and a cold war environment combined with a lack of threat 
made living up to the commitments hard to justify. Then comes the conflicts in the Balkans, 
and when the PCC is launched, the process repeats itself. Now, however, the cold war is over, 
the peace dividend is not relevant and the security environment is different. What then 
contributes to limited progress in the PCC? A possible explanation may be threat perception 
or domestic policy. 
 
Given that the U.S. continuously acquires new high tech assets, there will be challenges in 
closing the technological and doctrinal gap within NATO. There are a difference in threat 
perception and perception of the initiative itself. Meaning that the focus on crisis 
management and peace support for the European allies, lies as a contrast to the U.S. attention 
to high-tech warfare and homeland defense (Hagman 2002: 103). There were a common 
sense of responsibility on both sides of keeping the forces interoperable and enabling them to 
take advantage of the benefits of what Hagman refers to as “jointness”. If not dealt with, the 
standards of U.S.-led war-fighting coalitions and NATO peace enforcement would 
necessarily not be the same as those for EU-led operations. Though, NRF was argued to be 
able to bridge a part of the gap. The interests of the European allies and its access to U.S. 
transformational technology and doctrine will determine the level of success of capability 
initiatives (Ibid). 
 
The progress of the PCC is difficult to assess, as Lindley-French argue, most of the material 
on the initiative is classified. He argues, however, that there is “every reason to believe that 
such progress roughly concurs with that of the EU’s main military capabilities planning 
document, the EU Force Catalogue for Headline Goal 2010”. Of the 64 capability shortfalls, 
seven had formally been solved and four were showing signs of improvement. But as with 
DCI, the progress in the PCC initiative was patchy (Lindley-French 2007: 96–97). In their 
article Hans Binnendijk et al. argues that the DCI failed to achieve this worthy goal because 
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“it was scattered across too many forces and measures, and the Prague Capabilities 
Commitment evidently is encountering similar troubles” (Binnendijk, Gompert, and Kugler 
2005: 8). 
 
The PCC seemed therefore to have suffered the same fate as the DCI. Compared to the PCC, 
however, which experienced limited progress the initial development in the NRF was more 
promising. The session in the House of Commons reported that the development of NRF had 
been rapid and from its origin in 2002, it achieved initial operational capability in October 
2004, and full operational capability in November 2006. Up to 2008 the NRF had been 
deployed twice, first in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in September 2005, and second in 
Pakistan following the earthquake of October 2005 (UK Parliament 2008: 49).  
 
Despite his overall support for the NRF concept, in the session, General Deverell highlighted 
several problems with the NRF. For one, the burden for filling the force requirements fell on 
countries not involved in Afghanistan and Iraq. Two, the funding mechanism had some 
weaknesses that could be an obstacle to the actual use of the NRF. The principle referred to 
as “costs-lie-where-they-fall”, means that costs of deploying and sustaining NRF operations 
lies on the nation that provides with the components of the force at the time of its 
deployment. With any rapid deployment with the NRF follows costs on nations involved in 
the operation. The NRF funding mechanism has been criticized by some nations, where they 
states that deployments at short notice imposes unpredictable financial consequences, and 
acts as a disincentive to making contributions to the NRF (UK Parliament 2008: 51). Was the 
NRF a force where the level of ambition was difficult to maintain over time? Considering in 
terms of its funding mechanism, where the costs lie where they fall, the ambition of the NRF 
in itself is a problem. The members struggle with contributing with the troops, transport 
planes and helicopters needed to keep such large force at full readiness. Also, members are 
fully stretched in other NATO missions. 
 
What does this indicate? A 2008 inquiry of the House of Commons gives some indications on 
the recent developments of the initiatives from the Prague summit. In the inquiry, the MoD 
stated that before the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO had conducted a review of the PCC 
initiative and from this concluded that it had been a “valuable initiative” that had “prompted 
progress in capability development across the Alliance”. From this report however, they also 
found that there were a number of areas that remained, in which there was slow progress 
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because of financial or technical difficulties. In its view, 72% of the goals outlined in the 
PCC would be met by 2008. The remaining 28 % that included the most costly undertaking 
such as strategic lift, would take some longer time (UK Parliament 2008: 45). 
 
The MoD also stated that some witnesses emphasized that while the specific military 
capabilities were essential in underpinning NATO’s expeditionary operations, the largest 
shortfall in NATO capabilities was in fact “political preparedness” or “political will” (UK 
Parliament 2008: 47). Similarly, Colonel Christopher Langton argued that because NATO not 
principally was a military alliance, rather a political alliance trying to deliver military 
capacity, real complexities were created. At the time, with 26 countries, with 26 defense 
budgets and 26 constitutions, it will limit the preparedness to take part in expeditionary 
activity in addition to create some challenges in cooperation and coordination. Colonel 
Langton stated that the deployments of European armed forces revealed key differences by 
European members in political will to commit to expeditionary operations (UK Parliament 
2008: 47). On the lessons learned from PCC Andrew Budd stated that: 	  
“In the PCC for example, a lot of the things that were to be acquired was already in place. 
Not all of them came into fruition either. A lot of the assumptions on money were not based 
on real facts or evidence. There was euphoria, but the harsh reality of the defense budgets hit 
the alliance. The bottom line with the previous initiatives is that if you are not prepared to 
spend money, nothing will happen. And experience from the initiatives illustrated that nothing 
really happened” (Budd 2014 [Interview]). 
 
From this we can argue that despite the fact that there has been actual progress in PCC and 
other capability initiatives, the progress had been made on the low hanging fruits. The larger 
undertakings however, which is more costly and has a significant effect on the Alliance 
defense capabilities still has difficulties in succeeding. From this one can argue that because 
of the lack of will to spend money on the capabilities needed to bolster the Alliance, the PCC 
yielded limited results (UK Parliament 2008: 45). 
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3.5 Summary and concluding remarks 
This chapter outlined the priorities, the implementation process and the lessons learned from 
reform processes of the capabilities initiatives in NATO. By looking at the initiatives over 
time, patterns emerge of causal mechanisms that affect progress in capability initiatives. The 
finding suggests that NATO has throughout the years gone through many reforms with 
varying degrees of success. The lessons learned from the capability initiatives indicate that 
diverging interests and domestic politics plays important roles as a mechanisms that affect the 
reform process. Starting with diverging interests between the U.S. and European allies, to 
national economies and to the lack of political will, the tendency is that there is internal 
debates within the Alliance that limits real progress in the initiatives.  
 
Arguably, NATO itself has an unclear idea of its purpose in the modern era, where the allies 
refrain from contributing to the initiatives even if they commit to launching initiatives. 
Differences in threat perception, decreasing defense budgets and a lack of a general political 
will contributes to a number of challenges that make the success of the previous proposed 
initiative difficult. Though in the recent years changes have been made in the command 
structure itself to facilitate more efficiently reforms in NATO. Successfully reaching the 
goals of the capability initiatives however, remains difficult taking the lukewarm effort and a 
lack of will from the members into consideration. 
 
The past capability initiatives yielded limited progress. These initiatives do, however, come 
at the cost of national prestige or sovereignty. Allies must put aside national priorities and 
invest in defense assets to reach the intended goals. Without a clear consensus at this, and 
with hegemonic pressures from U.S. on both of these initiatives, further limited progress 
would be expected. 
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4 The Smart Defense initiative 
 
This chapter analyzes the progress of NATO’s Smart Defense initiative. The patterns 
identified and lessons learned from past initiatives will be employed in the analysis of the 
Smart Defense initiative. The chapter falls into four parts. Part one outlines the priorities, 
rationale and implementation process of Smart Defense. In addition, the pooling and sharing 
principle will be discussed. This provides the background required to discuss the progress of 
the initiative. Part two discusses the organizational dimension of NATO and the factors that 
influence the success of capability initiatives. Part three discusses the political dimension and 
an analysis of the factors that come into play in reform processes. Finally, some concluding 
remarks on what past experience and the theoretical perspectives can help assess the progress 
of the Smart Defense initiative.  
 
The theoretical perspectives focus on the importance of domestic politics and the 
organizational features that together influence decision-making behavior in reform processes. 
The purpose is to assess the shortcomings in past attempts in order to identify and explain 
how the favorable conditions may speak to the progress of Smart Defense. The challenges 
NATO faces today will be contrasted and discussed in light of the empirical evidence and 
theoretical framework. This provides an explanation of the causal mechanisms at play that 
affect the outcome of Smart Defense. 
 
NATO’s Smart Defense initiative is considered a means to get “more bang for the buck”. 
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen first unveiled the initiative in 2011 at the annual 
Wehrkunde Security conference in Munich. It was presented as a new approach in “ensuring 
greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility” (NATO 2011). It 
is an initiative that seeks to promote interstate cooperation with the goal of pooling and 
sharing resources. At the Chicago summit in May 2012, NATO leaders agreed to embrace 
Smart Defense as a changed outlook to ensure that the Alliance can develop, acquire and 
maintain the capabilities required to achieve its goals for NATO Forces 2020. The following 
section outlines the priorities, the goals and the rationale for Smart Defense (NATO 2012a; 
NATO 2011). 
 
  
 
55	  
4.1 Priorities 
The burden-sharing problem is at the core of NATO reform today. With this, how can Smart 
Defense deal with the challenges of the steady decrease in defense spending and contesting 
views on the purpose of the Alliance? As NATO officials state, the Smart Defense initiative 
represents, first of all, the approach for reaching the goals for NATO Forces 2020. The goal 
is to have “modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so 
that they can operate together and with partners in any environment” (NATO 2012d). To 
reach this goal, the development and delivery of the capabilities that missions require have to 
be improved. Improvements in interoperability is also fundamental, so that the allies can 
acquire and maintain key capabilities, make priorities, and consult on changes in the defense 
plans. This comes as an addition to national efforts and existing forms of multinational 
cooperation (Ibid). 
 
While the 2010 Strategic concept focuses on NATO’s tasks for the next decade, the Smart 
Defense initiative is intended to be the enabler that helps NATO define what the Alliance 
should look like from a capabilities perspective. To facilitate the reforms in the Alliance, the 
Chicago Defense Package was launched, comprised primarily of Smart Defense and 
Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) (Desit and Perks 2012: 4). It consists of a mix of new and 
existing initiatives. More specifically on the initiative, NATO stated that: 
 
“The new initiatives consist of Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative; the 
existing initiatives include the Lisbon Summit package focused on the Alliance’s most 
pressing capability needs; the ongoing reform of Alliance structures and processes; and the 
NATO Defence Planning Process” (NATO 2013e). 
 
The arguably most central initiative that comes with Smart Defense, CFI, is central in 
reforming the Alliance. On the one side, Smart Defense initiative represents the new outlook, 
and proposes how allies might implement goals in terms of efficient multinational capability 
development. On the other, CFI proposes how allies continue to use capabilities together 
effectively, in view of a decreasing operational tempo. It ensures that the Alliance retains the 
valuable gains in interoperability that is achieved in recent operations. In order to achieve this 
it will focus on expanded education and training, increased exercises and better use of 
technology (Desit and Perks 2012: 4). In short, where Smart Defense aims to pool countries 
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buying power to equip the Alliance with shared capabilities, CFI focuses on supporting 
measures in the areas of education and training, exercises and technology (Viereck 2013: 6).  
 
Smart Defense is different from past capability initiatives because of the pressing 
requirement for results. The challenges that the Alliance faces are becoming more complex 
and diverse then before where threats of terrorism coming from non-state actors, conflicts 
beyond NATO borders and new threats such as Cyber-attacks (NATO 2010: 10–11). With 
the 2010 Strategic Concept, the credible deterrence and Article V mission was strengthened, 
and at the same time more tasks and challenges were included. To increase the complexity, 
all of these challenges have to be met in a time where many allies are decreasing their 
defense spending and military structures. Smart Defense is a means to deal with this problem, 
and it requires change in the national as well as the alliance culture of cooperation 
(Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2012).  
 
The Smart Defense initiative is also innovative in other regards. Colonel (ret.) Andrew Budd 
at the Defense policy and capabilities directorate in HQ NATO, argued that Smart Defense is  
“Secretary General initiative, and when Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced Smart Defense 
in February 2011 in Munich, he took everybody by surprise, including his own staff.” As 
Budd points out, however:  
 
“His argument is sensible and the philosophy is sound. It is all about getting more output 
than the input. Where the U.S. is operating with one type of battle tank and fighting vehicles, 
European allies operates with more than 10 different. So by focusing on for example training 
on one vehicle as opposed to 10 different, saves costs” (Budd 2014 [Interview]). 
 
Budd points out some of the important and more severe deficiencies that have to be dealt 
with in the Alliance. This includes the failure to translate spending to effective capabilities 
and the problem of interoperability between the U.S. and European allies. Specifically, the 
initiative is based on areas of importance for NATO, in particular those that was agreed upon 
at the Lisbon summit in 2010. On the list of important capability areas are ballistic missile 
defense, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, maintenance of readiness, training and 
force preparation, effective engagement and force protection. With this, the Smart Defense 
initiative tries to set guidelines for future decision-making. Smart Defense is about providing 
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the required capabilities for the nations as well as for the Alliance as a whole. Table 4.1 
illustrates the constituents of the Smart Defense initiative (NATO 2012a). 
 
Table 4.1 Overview of the Smart Defense initiative (NATO 2012a). 
Smart Defense 
Priorities Mechanisms Goals Factors driving the initiative 
Prioritization 
Aligning national 
capability priorities with 
those of NATO 
 
Specialization 
Specialization “by design” 
where members 
concentrate their resources 
on their national strengths 
 
Cooperation 
Pooling resources. 
Cooperation either through 
groups of nations or 
strategic sharing in terms 
of geography, culture or 
common equipment. 
Coordination with 
partners 
In order to avoid 
duplication of 
resources, pooling 
and sharing 
necessitates 
cooperation. 
NATO Forces 2020 
Smart Defense is to 
ensure that the Alliance 
can develop, acquire and 
maintain the capabilities 
to reach the goals for 
NATO Forces 2020 
 
 
Multinational projects7 
The projects which 
includes better protection 
of NATO forces, better 
surveillance and training 
will deliver improved 
operational effectiveness, 
economies of scale and 
closer connections 
between the forces. 
Institutional structures 
Secretary General 
Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen 
 
 
Lack of 
interoperability 
 
 
Persistent capability 
shortfalls 
 
What are the components of Smart Defense? The initiative rests on three elements or pillars:  
 
(1) Prioritization: members prioritize the most pressing capability needs. 
(2) Specialization: members seek to increase focus on selective capabilities.  
(3) Cooperation: members seek to increase multinational cooperation.  
 
As seen in previous capability initiatives, these elements are not new. They have not been not 
easy to accomplish either, and if it had been easy to do so, it would have been done many 
years ago (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2012). Since these pillars are important in the 
analysis, they have to be elaborated. The first is prioritization. The 2010 Strategic Concept 
articulated the vision of the Alliance for the next decade. This included a commitment to 
ensure that NATO had the full range of capabilities necessary to undertake its three essential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For complete list see Table 4.4 
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core tasks: collective defense and deterrence, crisis management. In addition to this, the 2010 
NATO summit in Lisbon identified several key priorities, including crisis management, cyber 
security, terrorism, and counter piracy. The challenge is to align nations’ priorities with 
NATO’s collective priorities and to produce NATO-relevant capabilities (Blackwood 2012: 
88–89; Desit and Perks 2012: 4).  
 
The second pillar is specialization. As the Secretary General has proposed, the allies do not 
need to possess all possible military capabilities. Neither can they afford them. Instead, 
members are encouraged to specialize in particular capabilities that can help reduce the 
burden of trying to maintain a full spectrum military force in each member state.8 This 
specialization, however, must not be done unilaterally, but in a coordinated and transparent 
manner, so that the Alliance can remain capable and effective. Specialization touches on the 
issue on sovereignty, but in order to bolster the Alliance capabilities, and due to budget cuts, 
specialization is important (Desit and Perks 2012: 4; Blackwood 2012: 89).  
 
The third pillar is cooperation, which is taken to mean the pooling and sharing of resources. 
This involves engaging in common acquisition projects and promoting common maintenance 
and logistics efforts. With cooperation nation can achieve significant economies of scale, 
avoid costs and gain capabilities they could not afford on their own. It can take different 
forms such as in small groups of nations led by another nation, or strategic sharing by those 
who are geographically, culturally or technologically, are close (NATO 2012a; Desit and 
Perks 2012: 4). 
 
4.2 Rationale for reform  
As a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008, the world economy has been facing what 
most economists agree is the worst economic downturn in half a century. As a result of this 
recession, governments are applying budgetary restrictions, which in turn effect the defense 
spending. During the financial crisis, the security landscape has been changing and become 
more diverse and unpredictable. One recent example is the crisis in 2012 in Libya.9 This 
crisis underlined the unforeseeable nature of conflicts and the need for modern systems and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Many European allies have already abandoned this, such as UK, France and Germany (NATO 2013f).  
9 More on the implications of Libya see NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s article “NATO 
After Libya” (Rasmussen 2011).  
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facilities. The crisis in Libya also showed a need for less reliance on the U.S. for costly 
advanced capabilities. The current trend therefore stresses the necessity of rebalancing 
defense spending between the European members and the U.S. (NATO 2012a). 
 
When announced in 2011, Smart Defense received a muted response. It was seen as a weak, 
or naïve, attempt at dealing with the current and long-time problems of the Alliance. In 
several New York Times articles, the shrinking resources of the transatlantic Alliance is 
emphasized, and the new Smart Defense initiative is described as an initiative without any 
real influence. In a New York Times article journalists F. Stephen Larrabee and Peter A. 
Wilson emphasized pooling and sharing, where the principle is doing more with less. In their 
view, however, pooling and sharing is no panacea. The principle, however, could, as they 
argued, “help to rationalize defense efforts and reduce costs, but it cannot make up for 
sustained drops in defense spending. The danger is that the European allies will not do “more 
with less,” as NATO officials proclaim, but less with less” (The New York Times 2012).  
 
On paper, the Smart Defense initiative would appear an obvious if ambitious venture. The 
reality, however, and as journalist Judy Dempsey points out in her article, is more complex 
and beyond what the Smart Defense initiative can tackle. It also is considered as a resurfacing 
of a long time debate: 
 
“Europe’s defense ministries now blame their finance ministries for cutting their budgets to 
deal with the euro-zone crisis and the economic slowdown. But even when the economies 
were buoyant, the majority of NATO countries, excluding the United States and a handful of 
other members, were not prepared to increase their defense spending. If the crisis now makes 
it harder to spend more, at least there should be more of an effort to share resources” (The 
New York Times 2011). 
In sum, Smart Defense is considered as a good idea on paper, however it is perceived as a 
weak attempt to overcome major problems that have been a long-term debate in the Alliance. 
While it is stated that the initiative is to deal with recent developments in the world economy 
and security landscape, it is in reality another attempt at dealing with a yearlong 
development. As argued, the burden-sharing debate has always been a part of NATO, and 
bridging the gap has always been a challenge. With Smart Defense, as with previous 
initiatives, the goal is to get more equitable burden-sharing that makes the Alliance more 
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sustainable, capable and more able to cooperate. This problem, however, seem to be more 
difficult then ever. As the former U.S Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates warned: 
 
“If the current trends in the decline of European defence capabilities are not halted and 
reversed, future US political leaders – those for whom the Cold War was not the formative 
experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO 
worth the cost” (The Guardian 2011). 
 
Looking at development in defense expenditures over time, a pattern of decreasing defense 
expenditures is clear. Table 2 compares European and U.S. defense expenditures in NATO 
from 1990-2013, and illustrates the challenges that NATO faces with the initiative.  
 
Table 4.2 NATO expenditure Europe vs. U.S. 1990-2013 (NATO 2014a). 
 
Table 4.2 illustrates the burden-sharing problem within the Alliance. The gap between 
European and U.S. defense spending has increased since 1995. In addition for both the U.S. 
and European members, there has been a steady decline in defense spending since 2010. This 
may be as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis. While this is an important factor for 
explaining some of the challenges today, the financial crisis is, however, only one part of the 
overall problem. Also worth noting is the sudden increase after 2000 which can be explained 
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by the Alliance’s contribution in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq.10  The burden-sharing 
problem, and the challenges that NATO faces is clearer when defense expenditures are 
illustrated as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Table 4.3 shows the 
development that has threatened the Alliance for many decades and that poses as a challenge 
for the Smart Defense initiative.  
 
The operation in Afghanistan is NATO’s largest operation to date, and the first operation 
outside Europe (Larsen 2013: 1). Initially, NATO deployed its troops in Afghanistan in 2003, 
following the attacks of September 11, 2001 where NATO activated Article 5. The Alliance 
took formal control over International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003 and 
expanded its operation to concern the whole of Afghanistan by 2006. This contributed to 
political disagreement over burden-sharing as well as how to deal with insurgency. While 
commanding the ISAF, NATO has shown willing to evolve and take upon new missions, 
which reflected the reform process that began with the Prague summit in 2002. There the 
U.S. pushed the allies to transform their capabilities in order to take on new types of 
missions. The scope of the gap between European allies and U.S. was increasingly clear at 
this point. Table 4.2 and 4.3 reflects this development in the defense spending (Ibid: 3–4). 
 
Table 4.3 NATO defense expenditure as percentage of GDP 1990-2013 (NATO 2014a). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 More on the conflict in Afghanistan see Henrik B. L. Larsen’s “NATO in Afghanistan (Larsen 2013). 
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Table 4.3 shows a more distinct and different trend that illustrates the core of the burden-
sharing problem. Aggregate numbers are like a well designed coat, they can conceal as much 
as they reveal. In this context, it means that the numbers on defense spending must be read 
with caution. The numbers do, however, illustrate a trend that has been clear in the Alliance 
for many years. On an average from 1990 – 1994 the U.S. spent twice as much of their GDP 
on defense in NATO than the European members. This gap was narrowed for a short period 
in 1995-1999, but from 2000 the gap has increased. Table 4.3 illustrates also that there has 
been a steady decline in defense spending in Europe, which poses as a serious challenge for 
the Alliance. Furthermore, dealing with the many challenges is more relevant than ever where 
in 2012 President Obama announced a new guidance for defense planning and budgeting. 
Here the U.S. Department of Defense announced that in keeping with the evolving strategic 
landscape, the American posture in Europe must also change (Kay 2013: 114–115). With the 
U.S. pivot towards the East, and the new changes in size and orientation of the U.S. army, 
U.S. is diverting interests away from Europe, and encourage the allies to take responsibility 
over their own area (Larrabee et al. 2012: 99). 
 
An interesting note here is that there are different amount of members in the Alliance from 
1990-2013. The fact that the defense spending in Europe decreases over time is therefore an 
interesting argument. Adding members does not contribute to increased capabilities or 
increased defense spending. The defense expenditures in NATO since 1990 illustrates is the 
increasing problem within the alliance and the overall rationale for the Smart Defense 
initiative. The possibility for success of the initiative, on the other hand, will be covered in 
the following organizational and political dimension. 
 
4.3 Pooling and sharing 
One solution that the Smart Defense offers to many of the challenges that NATO faces is 
“pooling and sharing”. Pooling and sharing is a concept that has been common in previous 
attempts, and has emerged yet again in Smart Defense. The rhetoric in the DCI, PCC and 
Smart Defense all emphasize the need for pooling and sharing, so this is no quick fix. 
Evidence from past capability initiatives indicate that when there is a lack of a clear and 
present threat, the political support is low. This is also similar with the defense expenditures, 
that when the resources are scarce, the political support is low. In budgetary feasts, however, 
domestic politics always influenced the decision-making and thereby the political support.  
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These tendencies have determined the success of pooling and sharing. Thomas Overhage 
supports this argument. The reason pooling and sharing is difficult to implement is because of 
what Overhage refers to as a “trilemma” in defense expenditure. This trilemma consists of 
security, national sovereignty and resource efficiency. In the context of this thesis, security is 
taken to mean collective security. National sovereignty means focus on domestic politics or 
national priorities. As for resource efficiency, it is taken to mean the efficient approach of 
using the available resources, whether collectively or individually. They are factors that 
member state choose to emphasize differently as a result of political and strategic culture, 
tradition and particular interests. It is an important argument because it identifies a common 
pattern in the DCI and PCC, as well as Smart Defense. It is also based on the same arguments 
as that of the free-rider problem as well as the instrumental perspective, that domestic politics 
or national interests are prioritized (Overhage 2013: 328).  
 
In the U.S. the emphasis has generally been on security and national sovereignty, which has 
consequently led to high defense spending and the option of unlimited unilateral behavior. 
For Europeans the emphasis has been on resource efficiency and national sovereignty, which 
in turn leads to unilateral cuts and free-riding. The European allies consider that the military 
capabilities of the U.S. is sufficient to shelter the European members against threats. The 
behavior is individually rational, but collectively irrational. Looking at figure 1, the current 
situation today would be at the lower part of the trilemma, where the emphasis is on resource 
efficiency and national sovereignty. This leads to unilateral cuts or free-riding, as patterns 
over time indicate and as reflected in the current situation. This consequently leads to an 
alliance which strength is highly dependable on U.S. contributions. The current situation 
poses as a threat to this balance, which has to be dealt with in the reform process of Smart 
Defense. Adding to this challenge, the specialization pillar together with pooling and sharing 
will lead to allies focusing inwards, which is reflected by unilateral cuts and free-riding 
behavior, as illustrated in Figure 4.1 (Overhage 2013: 328). 
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Figure 4.1 Defense trilemma – based on figure by Overhage (Overhage 2013: 328). 
 
 
 
Changing the interests of a state, or what a state emphasizes, is highly difficult. As Wallace J. 
Thies argues, times of austerity are not favorable conditions for enhancing cooperation, such 
as with pooling and sharing. When the threat level is low and the resources are limited, 
burden-shifting and free-riding are more likely than real cooperation. He argues that 
cooperation between states is easier when there are plenty of resources and there is a common 
external threat. In the current situation in NATO, both of these factors are absent, which is 
why cooperation is difficult. In order for pooling and sharing to work, the current situation 
would have to be in the left part of the Figure, with a combination of resource efficiency and 
collective security. Here defense integration and division of labor is emphasize together with 
collective security (Overhage 2013: 332–333).  
 
Combining resource efficiency with national sovereignty, however, encourages cuts in 
defense spending and free-rider behavior.  If the level of threat increases, however, and the 
resources remain scarce, Thies sees a danger of political conflicts, meaning that the states 
will have difficulties in cooperating. But as long as the threat level stays low, a better 
economic situation will not enhance the prospects for multinational cooperation because there 
is no stimulus or incentive for such cooperation. This is in accordance with the theory of the 
“Tragedy of the Commons” referred to in chapter two, where there are no incentives for the 
herdsman to cooperate with the other, and he therefore acts in accordance with his own self-
interest (Overhage 2013: 332–333). 
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Because the resources are scarce in the Alliance today, as an effect of a long tendency of 
defense cuts and because of economic trends, combined with a low threat level, situation 4 in 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the current situation in the alliance. The implications of this is that there 
is no political will to contribute to a defense alliance, which in turn indicates that it is difficult 
to cooperate by the use of pooling and sharing. Had the economic situation in Europe and 
U.S. been different, however, it would have been easier to cooperate, but there would not be 
any incentives. The instrumental perspective supports this argument where self-interests 
affect decision-making behavior. Some may promote more cooperation, but in times of low 
level of threat and scarce resources, the promise of cooperation - and therefore the idea of 
pooling and sharing seems difficult to achieve.  
 
Figure 4.2 Ease of cooperation – based figure by Overhage (Overhage 2013: 334). 
 
 
With the current situation, as a consequence of a low level of threat and scarce resources, the 
Smart Defense will face challenges with regards to yielding actual results. In these cases, 
national interests are emphasized and decision-making behavior will reflect what is 
politically popular in the nations. This consequently results in a lack of political support for 
ventures that involve defense spending. As for the national priorities, in addition to lower 
taxes, balanced budgets and generous welfare programs, military strength is also politically 
popular. Having military strength means that the nation can deter wars, stoke national provide 
and provide jobs and technological spin-offs. Paying for this, however, require higher taxes, 
wider deficits or cuts in welfare programs. With the Smart Defense the excludable goods will 
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be prioritized, and free-riding behavior on the non-excludable good of defense in NATO will 
occur (Thies 2003: 14). 
 
The discussion above finds that pooling and sharing is a difficult venture. What pooling and 
sharing may contribute with, however, is that it may help rationalize defense efforts, and even 
help reduce the costs. What it cannot do, however, is make up for the sustained decrease in 
defense spending. There are therefore limitations and obstacles with Smart Defense. Despite 
of the promising aspects of the initiatives, there are limitations to the level of multinational 
integration it is possible to achieve. For most of the allies, the members have national tasks 
and responsibilities that must be handled on a national basis. Requirements to the initiative is 
therefore not on the agenda. This goes for shared units in the force structure and for 
specialization in critical capabilities. Many countries, such as Norway, may therefore decide 
that they will maintain a full spectrum of basic military capabilities to remain capable to deal 
with vital national requirements. Although an important aspect, this should not stand in the 
way of multinational cooperation in capability development (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 
2012).   
 
Lessons from DCI indicate that there were no changes in the defense budgets when pooling 
and sharing was encouraged. As for the PCC, a lack of political will to commit to pooling and 
sharing of the resources, resulted in limited progress. The U.S. continuously acquired new 
high tech assets, which created a technological gap the European members were unable and 
unwilling to close. Instead Europe has been used to the fact that U.S. has taken most of the 
defense burden. With the concept of pooling and sharing, the free rider problem occurs.  
Also, as outlined in chapter three, Europeans hesitated to buy U.S. made material in areas 
such as strategic airlift, communications and precision-guided munitions because this offered 
little benefit for European defense industries 
 
As described, a problem that NATO often faces is the collective action problems. Sean Kay 
describes this as “the dilemma of who provides for common goals when multiple states are 
engaged” (Kay 2013: 99). The central problem here is that if there is one large actor with 
interests in the provision of an outcome, then the smaller countries can, without contributing 
costs or risk, reap the benefits. The free-riding argument is relevant here, where Kay argues 
that collective defense, as in NATO, became a public good during the Cold War. This was a 
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benefit, which once provided, was taken advantage of by all members, regardless of their 
contributions. And where one large nation has a greater demand for a public good than 
others, it will prioritize this, and provide a disproportionate level of this collective good. The 
smaller states, on the other hands, sees this defense costs a burden, and choose not to 
contribute to the military obligations, knowing that the larger countries with interests in the 
Alliance will defend it if the situation arose where it was threatened. The free-rider problem 
occurs when the smaller states invest in line with national priorities, and free-rides on the 
public good of collective defense (Ibid). 
 
Smart Defense, in Karl-Heinz Kamp’s view, faces one crucial political problem. A high level 
of political trust is required in order to pool and share resources. The allies must therefore be 
certain that the partners that the capabilities are shared with deliver on their part in case of 
need. If there are any doubts with regard to the political will of the allies, either on their 
ability to contribute in time of need or the ability to execute decisions on military actions (for 
example where there are parliamentary regulations), Kamp argues that pooling and sharing 
will fail. This has been illustrated by the Libya operation, where some NATO allies not only 
refused to take part but withdrew their military forces from common operations (Kamp 2011: 
7). And where Kamp argues that the cooperation with the pooling and sharing will pose 
problems, Bastian Giegerich argues that the specialization is by far the most difficult. This is 
because it directly affects the member states sovereignty (Giegerich 2012 :70).  
 
Andrew Budd supports this argument and argues that in “the three principles, or constituents 
of the initiative, the specialization principle can limit the progress of Smart Defense”. In line 
with the discussion on pooling and sharing in relation to the current situation, Budd argued 
that “it all comes down to sovereignty” and explains: 
 
“As a small nation, if the alliance asks you to move down a particular path of specialization, 
it will ultimately result in that you rely on everybody else for the full spectrum of military 
capabilities. There is no European member that has the full spectrum of military capability. 
Only the U.S. has this capability. Where Europe has sovereignty in decision-making, the 
decisions are limited by what we can achieve. This is why specialization may limit the 
progress of Smart Defense” (Budd 2014 [Interview]). 
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What this thesis finds is that pooling and sharing is a venture that may be too difficult to 
accomplish. The three pillars may cause some difficulties in the reform process. This, 
however, is not the only challenge that the Alliance facing in implementing Smart Defense. 
The following sections go deeper into the different challenges by outlining the 
implementation process and the current progress.  
 
4.4 Implementing Smart Defense  
The Smart Defense initiative is seen as a new approach “which seeks to better align the 
collective requirements and national priorities of Member States” (NATO 2012c). Allies 
agreed that instead of pursuing national solutions, they purse more multinational solutions, 
where this is efficient and cost-effective. There is some collaboration between NATO and the 
European Union (EU) on this part, but the focus for this thesis is on NATO and its members’ 
ability to live up to the commitments in the initiatives.11 The goal of NATO Forces 2020 is to 
have a modern, tightly connected forces which has the equipment, are trained, exercised and 
commanded in order to effectively cooperate (NATO 2012c; NATO 2012d).  
 
Smart Defense is at the heart of making this goal a reality. In his article, Secretary General 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen summarizes the initiative as “building security for less money by 
working together and being more flexible. He argues that the initiative is also about 
encouraging multinational cooperation. And in a time where military equipment is expensive, 
“European states acting alone may struggle to afford high-tech weapons systems such as the 
ones used in Libya” (Rasmussen 2011).  
 
4.4.1 Multinational projects and CFI 
What Rasmussen proposes as a solution is to the Europeans to work in small clusters so that 
they can combine their resources and build the required capabilities that can in turn benefit 
the whole Alliance. Rasmussen sees NATO as a “matchmaker” in this process where it is 
“bringing nations together to identify what they can do jointly at a lower cost, more 
efficiently, and with less risk” (Rasmussen 2011). To reach these goals, NATO stated in the 
declaration on capabilities at the Chicago Summit: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For more on NATO-EU cooperation, see ”NATO-EU: working to fill gaps in defence capabilities ”(NATO 
2012c). 
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“The development and deployment of defence capabilities is first and foremost a national 
responsibility. But as technology grows more expensive, and defence budgets are under 
pressure, there are key capabilities which many Allies can only obtain if they work together to 
develop and acquire them. We therefore welcome the decisions of Allies to take forward 
specific multinational projects, including for better protection of our forces, better 
surveillance and better training. These projects will deliver improved operational 
effectiveness, economies of scale, and closer connections between our forces” (NATO 2012d).  
 
The allies are encouraged to take forward specific multinational projects, for better protection 
of the Alliance forces, better surveillance and training. The declaration states that the purpose 
of the projects is to deliver “improved operational effectiveness, economies of scale, and 
closer connections between our forces”. In addition to this, it will provide experience for the 
allies to conduct future Smart Defense projects (NATO 2012d).  
 
In the summit declaration, Smart Defense is presented as a changed outlook and as an 
opportunity to renew the culture of cooperation where multinational collaboration is given a 
new prominence. It is considered an effective and efficient option for developing critical 
capabilities. They emphasize the importance of EU cooperation in order to ensure that Smart 
Defense and EU pooling and sharing initiative is complementary and mutually reinforcing 
(NATO 2012d). Smart Defense is therefore considered the general approach towards NATO 
Forces 2020.  
 
The CFI, however, is the primary means to demonstrate continued effectiveness and 
interoperability. CFI is a key part of an integrated set of programs. These programs include 
NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), Smart Defense and other relevant initiatives from 
the Lisbon and Chicago summit. Where NDPP focuses in identifying capability shortfalls, 
and Smart Defense contributes to build new capabilities, CFI is the mean to prepare the 
forces, and to ensure the readiness and interoperability. As Vlastimil Hujer argues, “the aim 
of CFI, for which ACT is the lead, is to ensure that the Alliance keeps its forces connected 
and retains and builds on the valuable gains in interoperability achieved in NATO’s recent 
operations between allies and partners” (Hujer 2014: 3).  
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Most obvious in the implementation process of CFI will be a significant increase in the 
number and scope of major joint and multinational exercises. The first of the many is the 
Trident Jaguar in May 2014 (Hujer 2014: 3). Furthermore, as Knud Bartels, the Chairman of 
the NATO Military Committee argued, “Exercise Trident Juncture 2015 will be a practical 
demonstration of the Alliance’s shift from a deployed to a prepared outlook, a launch pad for 
our future training and modalities, and a flagship for Connected Forces Initiative and 
NATO”. In this reform process, the CFI is central (NATO 2014b).  
 
Because CFI is important in this context because it is considered a “whole NATO initiative”, 
which means that it affects all aspects of the staff and forces of the Alliance, from training to 
exercises to standardization (Hujer 2014: 3). At the meeting of North Atlantic Council, in 
Defense ministers session, Secretary General Rasmussen discussed the Smart Defense 
initiative as the new mind-set and stated that: 
 
“As we prepare to wind down some of our operational deployments, we must also prepare to 
face the unpredictable challenges of the future. Our Connected Forces Initiative will be at the 
forefront of delivering the modern, tightly connected, high readiness forces we need. And for 
ensuring we are ready to operate together in the most demanding circumstances” (NATO 
2013g). 
 
CFI is therefore central in moving the Alliance towards its intended goals. The focus for this 
thesis, however, is mainly on the overreaching Smart Defense initiative. This is because it 
constitutes the “new” approach, where CFI is only the means, or the tool to accomplish the 
future goals of the Alliance. 
 
Central to meeting these goals are the multinational projects. Soon after Smart Defense was 
first announced, Rasmussen appointed two special envoys – General Sephane Abrial, 
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, and Claudio Bisogniero, then Deputy Secretary 
General – that would develop a package of multinational projects to be explored at the 
Chicago Summit in 2012 (Blackwood 2012: 88). And at the summit NATO heads of state 
and government approved a concrete package of multinational projects, including for better 
protection of NATO forces, better surveillance and better training (NATO 2012a).  
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4.4.2 Implementation progress 
Some progress has been made in the implementation of Smart Defense. Currently, as of 2014, 
there are 27 Smart Defense multinational projects that seek to deliver improved operational 
effectiveness, economies of scale and connectivity between the national forces. They are 
multinational solutions to national capability requirements (Perks 2014: 5; NATO 2013a: 1). 
In a press release on August 14, 2013 NATO announced that the allies have successfully 
completed the first of the many multinational projects, namely the “Multinational Logistics 
Partnership-Helicopter Maintenance”. This U.S. – led project, which was completed in august 
2013, was a part of the initial batch launched by NATO leaders at the Chicago summit in 
2012. It established helicopter facilities in Afghanistan allowing allies to pool their spare 
parts, tools and technicians to make most of the deployed resources (NATO 2013a: 3; NATO 
2013h). The second completed project is the “Dismantling, Demilitarization and Disposal of 
Military Equipment”. With this, there are 27 active projects and about 120 proposals under 
development (Perks 2014: 5). 
 
Table 4.4 Multinational projects (Perks 2014: 5; NATO 2013a). 
1 NATO Universal Armaments Interface. 
2 Remotely controlled robots for clearing roadside bombs. 
3 Pooling Maritime Patrol Aircraft. 
4 Multinational Cooperation on Munitions (Munitions Life-Cycle Management). 
5 Multinational Aviation Training Centre. 
6 Pooling & Sharing Multinational Medical Treatment Facilities. 
7 Multinational Logistics Partnership for Fuel Handling. 
8 Multinational Logistics Partnership - Mine Resistant Ambush Vehicle (MRAP) maintenance. 
9 Deployable Contract Specialist Group. 
10 Immersive Training Environments. 
11 Centres of Excellence as Hubs of Education and Training. 
12 Computer Information Services (CIS) E-Learning Training Centres Network. 
13 Individual Training and Education Programmes. 
14 Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm. 
15 Female Leaders in Security and Defence. 
16 Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG HQ). 
17 Pooling of Deployable Air Activation Modules (DAAM). 
18 Theatre Opening Capability. 
19 Multinational Military Flight Crew Training. 
20 Counter IED – Biometrics. 
21 Establishment of a Multinational Geospatial Support Group (GSG). 
22 Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MNCD2). 
23 Harbour Protection. 
24 Pooling CBRN Capabilities. 
25 Development of Personnel Reserve Capabilities. 
26 Alliance Defence Analysis and Planning for Transformation (ADAPT). 
27 Defensive Aids Suite (DAS). 
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How important are these projects, and how difficult are they to complete? In an interview, 
Andrew Budd argued that many of them are not that difficult to complete, but “the projects 
concerning training, however, are important in the long run. Instead of having to train on 
several types of capabilities, coordinated training on a main type is more efficient” (Budd 
2014 [Interview]). He argued that the multinational projects were not going to produce the 
vast capabilities the alliance need, but that:  
 
“They need […] to start somewhere, and these projects are important as a starting point. It is 
also important for a number of nations, for example Eastern European states, where the new 
allies have little or no experience on capability procurement acquisition. Because they have 
to start from scratch, the multinational projects are important in terms of education and 
building confidence” (Budd 2014 [Interview]). 
 
NATO’s role in all of this is to assist the allies in identifying the practical areas for 
cooperation and facilitate as well as encourage progress. This is done within NATO’s 
capability planning domains, and committees oversee the process. As of 2014, considerable 
progress has been made in shared training that will enable the Alliance Ground Surveillance 
capability as well as address lessons learned from Operation Unified Protector in Libya. The 
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) plays an integral role in promoting the overall 
vision of Smart Defense. ACT’s current priorities are the capability areas of Joint Intelligence 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) (Perks 2014: 
5). Despite some encouraging results, overall one could argue that the progress has been 
limited. Andrew Budd argues that:  
 
“Not that much progress has been made with Smart Defense at the moment. There are, 
however, projects that actually have made some progress, such air policing and AGS. These 
are projects that are functioning Smart Defense principles. These big-ticket items, however, 
either it being strategic airlift or air policing, predates Smart Defense. What Smart Defense 
does is codify this philosophy. The Secretary general wants the members think multinational 
procurement first, rather than last” (Budd 2014 [Interview]).  
 
With two completed multinational projects, one could argue that the progress and 
implementation of Smart Defense has been limited. With the multinational projects, and in 
regards to pooling and sharing, there are two aspects that separate Smart Defense from 
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previous capability initiatives. One, it has been launched in an almost unique political 
environment with the financial crisis which add pressure on the national budgets than ever 
before, and where the “big spenders” have undergone significant cuts in their defense 
expenditures (Kamp 2011: 7).  
 
The second way that separates Smart Defense from past initiatives is that the Secretary 
General placed considerable emphasis on his Smart Defense idea by naming two (one civilian 
and one military) special envoys for this issue – Deputy Secretary General Bisognero and the 
Commander Allied Command Transformation, General Abrial. Their task was to raise 
general awareness in member state capitals and thereby general political pressure for 
NATO’s member governments (Kamp 2011: 7). On the concept of pooling and sharing, 
Andrew Budd argues that:  
 
“There are many great successes, such as the European Air Transport Command.  But today, 
Smart Defense address things that are already in place. Smart Defense does not go beyond 
that, but what it does is aspire to multinational acquisition in the future.” (Budd 2014 
[Interview]). 
 
This, however, is too early to conclude. Some reports have come in on the progress of the 
initiative. In a report of the Standing Committee on National Defense, in the Canadian 
Parliament, Professor Jennifer Welsh expressed caution with respect to the specialization 
element of Smart Defense, where she pointed to the problem of relying on allies to contribute 
with the capabilities needed. Canada experienced such problems in Afghanistan, where they 
had to rely on helicopters from U.S. and UK for air transport (Canadian Parliament 2013: 4–
5). 
 
Defense analyst David Perry also addressed these challenges and argued that the Operation 
Unified Protector in Libya “demonstrated both the potential benefits of NATO Smart 
Defence and the likely challenges involved in implementing it” (Canadian Parliament 2013: 
4–5). He argued that the operation exposed existing burden-sharing problems, which could be 
worsened with declining defense budgets, noting that only eight countries contributed in the 
air campaign. In Libya, some allies also had to withdraw as a consequence of funding 
shortfalls, and combining this with national caveats, the operation as a whole highlighted the 
dependence on U.S. assets.  The specialization as well as the cooperation component, will 
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therefore require political will in order to work effectively (Ibid). As for the NATO Response 
Force (NRF), it will continue to be important and is a major component of the CFI. Here the 
national forces in NRF will train together, and it will remain a key tool to ensure 
interoperable forces  (Ibid: 15).  Erik Breidlid, Counselor Defense Policy at Norway’s 
permanent delegation to NATO, argues that despite that Smart Defense has not yet yielded 
the expected success, it is still incorrect to say that it is entirely unsuccessful. He argues that:  
 
“A number of projects are under development, and cooperation on these are largely 
institutionalized in NATO with the Connected Forces Initiative. Consequently, the main 
benefit of Smart Defense may not necessarily be new products, or capabilities, but rather the 
expansion or improvement of multilateral cooperation among Allies. The importance of such 
cooperation is expected to grow further in the years to come” (Breidlid 2014 
[Correspondence]). 
 
With the Smart Defense initiative, governments would have to invest in existing areas of 
excellence while giving up capability in other areas, and this would need to be coordinated 
through NATO to ensure a coherent and mutually supportive set of capabilities. The three 
pillars of Smart Defense would increase mutual dependency in a military (and ultimately also 
political) sense. Implementation would thus rely on active member-state engagement 
(Giegerich 2012: 70). As for now, despite of some progress, the argument is that Smart 
Defense yields limited results. The following discussions, the organizational and political 
dimension, will assess Smart Defense in light of past experience and the theoretical 
framework.  
 
4.5 The organizational dimension 
The organizational dimension of the analysis focuses on how organizational features affect 
the member states decision-making in living up to capability commitments. Relevant aspects 
to address here is path dependency and threat perception. In explaining the organizational 
dimension, the cultural and myth perspective is used. Over the years, NATO has developed 
norms and values that have become embedded in the Alliance. In a cultural perspective these 
norms and value evolve and become important for the activities of the organization. Over 
time they develop and the organization acquires institutional features. Like in NATO, there 
has been a development of norms and values, which has developed and made NATO an 
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institutionalized organization. In the cultural perspective on reform, these characteristics may 
pose some challenges. Previous attempts at capability initiatives have faced these challenges 
and Smart Defense will face the same. This section will discuss threat perception and path 
dependency since they are relevant organizational aspects that will pose as challenges for 
Smart Defense. 
 
4.5.1 Threat perception and path dependency 
In the cultural perspective outlined by Christensen et al., reforms happen incrementally even 
glacially. Instead of revolution, there is evolution. Reforms undergo processes where 
traditional values and norms are balanced against new, where the organization adapts to 
external and internal pressures. The fate of the reform depends on the degree to which there is 
normative correspondence between the new and those existing in the organization. This 
section will argue that changed perceptions of the organizational environment may bring 
about reform, but that, over time, the organization becomes path dependent, which limits 
organizational change. 
 
As outlined in chapter two, the cultural perspective emphasize that reforms also occur as a 
consequence of changed perceptions on the situation the organization faces. This may involve 
the organizations identity or its fundamental goal. If the situational perception the Alliance 
faces changes, or if the situation fails to correspond with the identity of an organization, 
reforms may occur. This argument indicates that reforms may have some potential success, 
because of a changing security environment. Seen from past experience, however, the DCI 
and PCC had limited success. In this context, what can situational or threat perception and 
path dependency say about the progress of Smart Defense?  
 
Compared to the dramatic change that occurred with the end of the Cold War, and with the 
limited progress of DCI and PCC, the argument is that the limited progress is as a 
consequence of limited changes in the security environment. The changes that followed 
immediately after the end of the Cold War were more successful because of a critical change 
in the threat perception. The argument of critical junctures is important here. The end of the 
Cold War was a significant event, and the Alliance needed another purpose, another identity. 
But there has not been any such event after that, only situations that bring about different 
interests in reforms. NATO has no clear and present threat that may pose as a challenge. 
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Consequently, the allies focus their attention elsewhere, and thus they focusing their 
resources towards national priorities. With no clear and present threat, there is no political 
will to contribute to large investments. As experience from DCI and PCC indicates, without 
any clear and present threat, legitimizing contributions to a defense Alliance is difficult. 
 
As outlined in the cultural perspective, reforms occur as a consequence of changed 
perceptions on the situation the organization faces, on the identity or what it stands for. It is 
therefore a matter of a relationship between situation and identity. In the context of 
implementing Smart Defense, many if the allies are still feeling the effects of the economic 
recession, and conflict management operations as well as upholding the capability for 
collective defense is difficult to legitimize nationally. Members therefore emphasize national 
priorities before investing in large operations, because they find themselves in a security 
environment without any clear and present threat. Thinking in these lines affected the 
progress of previous initiatives, and may also come to impact on the progress of Smart 
Defense.  
 
Because the Alliance lacks a clear and present threat, situational perception is considered 
important for explaining why allies fail to live up to alliance commitments. National 
priorities, or domestic politics, will be emphasized as a result of the allies backing out of 
Afghanistan and the decreasing defense spending. Reforms that correspond with this trend 
will therefore be preferred over reforms that may be more optimal. With the DCI and the 
PCC, allies wanted to bolster the defense capability of the Alliance to be able to deal with the 
emerging security problems. Perceptions may therefore bring about reform processes, but 
here the path dependency argument is important. Where changes in threat perception bring 
about reform, path dependency limits the progress.  
 
Since its inception, NATO has developed norms and values that have become embedded in 
the organization. Goals, values and norms have developed through different contexts and 
through different Strategic Concepts. Smart Defense seeks to achieve benefits from a new 
cooperation culture in the Alliance. This will, however, be difficult to change. An 
organization established at a specific point in history is shaped by the specific cultural 
context or norms and values, which leaves a permanent impression on it. Goals, values and 
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norms established in the early formal years of the Alliance had significant influence of the 
subsequent development, and are hard to change.  
 
Regarding the DCI, the Cold War legacy influenced the reform process and influenced the 
progress. European members will therefore be reluctant to implementing the agreed reforms, 
because of the embedded environment with U.S. protection. This affects the burden-sharing 
issue as well as U.S. as the hegemonic power. One can argue, however, that this Cold War 
legacy had disappeared when PCC was launched. Established norms and values on the other 
hand, are resistant to change. The effect of path dependence is that it may render the 
organization inflexible. This is a problem for an organization as NATO, which lives in an 
environment prone to rapid change. As a consequence, a gap emerges between the external 
challenges of the Alliance and the internal culture. In turn, it may affect the decision-making 
of the allies. 
 
Why is the path dependency argument important with Smart Defense? It is argued here that 
this is because of either “increasing returns” or “historical inefficiency”. With historical 
inefficiency, the costs of changing the organization often become too great. The fate of the 
reform depends on the normative correspondence between the new and already existing 
structures in the organization. If they are incompatible with established norms and values 
they will be rejected. The pooling and sharing component of Smart Defense, that seek to deal 
with issues such as the burden-sharing problem, may be a difficult venture. This is because 
the European allies are used to being under U.S. protection, as they have since the beginning. 
The norms and values that were created in the early years of the Alliance are becoming 
increasingly more difficult to change. In 2014, the burden-sharing gap is greater than ever, 
and poses as a real challenge for making some progress with regards to the Smart Defense 
initiative.  
 
As past experience indicates, European allies see the alternative structures as overly costly, 
which in turn influence the decision-making behavior resulting in a lack of political support 
and failing to living up to commitments. Because of the Cold war legacy, the Alliance is less 
flexible. The Cold War legacy influences the decision-making. Because the members think of 
the structure as it was, there is little chance that it will change. The embedded norms and 
values established early in the organization limit future actions and development. From 1990 
 
 
78	  
there has been a steady decrease in defense spending, with some exceptions. This is a trend 
that in a cultural perspective is very difficult to turn.  
 
Over the years, the organization becomes more complex - that is, less flexible or adaptable to 
new demands. As outlined in chapter two, goals that are established during the foundation of 
an organization will significantly influence the subsequent development. These goals are not 
easy to change, not even when contexts and environments change. The cost of changing the 
organization often becomes too great. This reflects what is referred to as “historical 
inefficiency”. The identity of a Cold War Alliance is one difficult to change, and now the 
Alliance attempts to institutionalize the Smart Defense philosophy. The historical 
inefficiency of the Cold War legacy is something that NATO has been living with a long 
time, which can be reflected in the burden-sharing debate and issue of interoperability. In a 
cultural perspective, such norms and values are hard to change. The implementation of Smart 
Defense is an attempt to change this line of thinking. In an telephone interview with Colonel 
(ret.) Andrew Budd, he stated that all of the allies, in a varying degree, enthusiastic about the 
initiative, and argued that: 
 
“They all talk about it, and defense ministers are mentioning it. There is a creeping 
understanding of the importance of Smart Defense, but not on how they will make the 
initiative a reality. If Smart Defense becomes institutionalized or becomes a philosophy in 
NATO, however, then there is hope” (Budd 2014[Interview]). 
 
Changing the organizational culture, or the already institutionalized norms and values is 
difficult. The goal of Smart Defense is to change the philosophy of NATO, the way of 
thinking defense. To change already institutionalized norms and values that have been 
embedded in the alliance over time, however, is a difficult venture. Consequently, as of early 
2014 not much has been done with regards to the Smart Defense initiative, but the intention 
of the initiative brings up an important argument. As mentioned, the initiative is an attempt to 
codify the philosophy of multinational procurement, in trying to make members think along 
these lines.  Smart Defense can be seen as a philosophy or a mindset, which the alliance tries 
to institutionalize, but the Cold War legacy, however, and the already institutionalized norms, 
values and identities are hard to change. 
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4.5.2 Organizational design  
With Smart Defense, NATO signals a new direction of economic responsibility. The myth 
perspective emphasizes the importance of myths and how organizations adopt attractive 
recipes for organizational design, although they may not be optimal. In order for 
organizations to gain legitimacy, they often use methods that are generally accepted. These 
recipes for organizational design may be popular recipes that “all” organizations use at a 
certain time, and imitation is therefore common. 
 
Reform initiatives that corresponds with current doctrine of what a “good organization” 
should operate, will gain acceptance. Initiatives that diverge from this are therefore not 
chosen. Therefore, organizations will use reforms that are widespread. This can either be 
mimicking past or similar reforms, or using what is considered as a workable recipe for 
reform. Smart Defense could be considered as an initiative, which corresponds with the 
perception of what is rational, reasonable and modern. In a time where the resources are 
scarce, an alliance with no clear threat must legitimize its existence. The reform must 
therefore correspond with the prevailing ideas in the environment, being saving money and 
making a lean and effective alliance.  
 
Smart Defense may therefore be considered as legitimate, but not necessarily optimal. The 
initiative could be launched in order to enhance the legitimacy of the Alliance, by thinking 
smart and economical. The new design may also be about making the Alliance missions 
legitimate for its members. This also affects the decision-making. Because the members can 
now easier legitimize using resources in the Alliance, the political support will increase. 
NATO will therefore gain legitimacy through acting, meaning reforming the Alliance. The 
initiatives themselves can give the Alliance some purpose, in working towards making it a 
credible and capable alliance.  
 
Some argues that the initiative is just a “bumper sticker” to gain legitimacy, that Smart 
Defense is a signal that increasing defense expenditures is the easiest solution to the problem. 
From the post-Cold War era, where the slogan was “out of area, or out of business”, the 
slogan now is “pool it, or loose it” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2012). The initiative is 
also considered more as a philosophy than a list of goals, compared to DCI and PCC. This 
may seem as a rational way of doing things, thinking multinational and pooling the resources 
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in order to reach the common goal of an effective and credible alliance. Isomorphic mimicry 
is an important note. Organizations, such as NATO, adopt generally accepted and rational 
recipes that correspond with what a good organization should look like. The greater the 
correspondence is between problem definitions and suggestion solutions in reform programs, 
the easier it will be to gain legitimacy. And Smart Defense corresponds with a recipe for how 
to run an organization in a time of austerity. Organizations will therefore mimic each other. 
Here the argument is that the initiative is considered a rational and popular reform design. 
Concepts such as pooling and sharing are perceived as the rational ways to deal with current 
problems. As the discussion on pooling and sharing indicates, however, this is difficult. It 
may be perceived as rational, and thereby gain legitimacy, but it is not optimal.  
 
The Smart Defense initiative was presented as a new approach and as an opportunity to 
renew the way allies cooperate where multinational collaboration is given a new prominence. 
It is considered an effective and efficient option for developing critical capabilities. As 
Andrew Budd argue: 
 
“It is a renewed culture of cooperation that encourages Allies to cooperate in developing, 
acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s essential core 
tasks agreed in the new NATO strategic concept (NATO 2012a) 
 
As the current progress indicates, and past experience shows, two of the components of 
Smart Defense, pooling and sharing and specialization, are difficult ventures for the Alliance. 
The initiative in itself and the proposed organizational form, however, are considered as 
rational in a time of austerity, which helps the Alliance gain legitimacy. This organizational 
form, however, is not optimal. As seen, the multinational projects are difficult to complete 
and a large part of them fail to contribute real capabilities that the Alliance need. Pooling and 
sharing is also a rational way of operating, on paper. In reality, however, pooling and sharing 
are difficult ventures. There are several organizational factors that limit progress in the Smart 
Defense initiative. The next section focuses on the political factors that come into play in 
reform processes in NATO. 
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4.6 Political dimension 
The political dimension of the analysis focuses on how domestic politics and self-interests 
affect the member states decision-making in living up to alliance commitments. Relevant 
aspects to address here are the burden-sharing debate, the concept of pooling and sharing, and 
the diverging interests that have emerged because of contested views of the purpose of the 
Alliance. Assessing these aspects in light of past experience and the theoretical framework 
help explain the progress of Smart Defense. In explaining the political dimension, the 
instrumental perspective, as well as the collective action and free rider problem, is applied.  
 
4.6.1 Burden-sharing and reform 
Over the years, the burden-sharing debate has contributed to several reforms, and the internal 
debate in the Alliance on how to deal with this problem indicates that aligning national 
interests with those of NATO is a difficult venture. Table 4.2 and 4.3 illustrates the 
increasing gap in defense expenditures between the U.S. and European members, a gap that 
in 2014 is larger than ever. This has an effect on the ability to live up to alliance ventures and 
the interoperability of the alliance. DCI and PCC tried to cope with these problems, but failed 
in the attempt. But what is different with Smart Defense? Informed by experience from past 
capability initiatives, what challenges does NATO face today in implementing the Smart 
Defense initiative? These questions will be answered in this section by discussing the 
importance and relevance of the burden-sharing debate and how it affects the ability to live 
up to alliance commitments.  
 
The challenge of collective action 
Experience from the DCI and PCC as well as economic trends indicates that the burden-
sharing debate is still relevant in NATO. From an instrumental perspective this ongoing 
debate will pose as a problem for the Smart Defense initiative. This thesis argues that when 
the burden-sharing debate resurfaces, as it does reform processes, it revives old conflicts and 
reveals patterns of strategic interests. Lessons learned from DCI and PCC indicate that 
limited progress in the reforms came as a consequence of a lack of political support in the 
initiatives. This was because there were diverging interests between the U.S. and European 
members on the need to reform. 
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With Smart Defense, these patterns of interests are revived, and the burden-sharing debate 
becomes relevant. In past attempts the U.S. had strong interests in changing the existing 
structure by emphasizing the need for a more equitable burden-sharing. There was significant 
hegemonic pressure within the Alliance with the U.S. emphasizing the need for reform. 
Lessons learned from the DCI indicate that the European members were unable to find the 
necessary funding to invest in modern forces, and because of an intrinsic complacency under 
U.S. protection from the inception and throughout the Cold War, the allies were not willing 
to invest in the initiative. With the PCC, however, the conflicts in Europe were resolved and 
there was no political will to live up to the commitments in the initiative. Instead the factors 
that were affecting the progress were domestic politics, where national interests were 
prioritized. In addition, with many years of decreasing defense spending and with no clear 
and present threat, legitimizing investment in defense was difficult.  
 
The argument of diverging interests between the European allies and the U.S. is relevant with 
regards to the Smart Defense initiative. There are, however, some differences when 
comparing Smart Defense with DCI and PCC. As opposed to past reforms, there are more 
pressing requirements for reforms with the new initiative. Karl A. Lamers argues that despite 
of the success of the Libyan operation “Unified Protector”, the operation uncovered several 
deficiencies in NATO’s military capabilities in Europe, as well as the ongoing reliance on 
U.S. assets. Adding the Arab awakening, the Libya mission and the events in Syria, it has 
proven that the security environment is still characterized by uncertainty (NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly 2012). In relation the operation in Libya and the deficiencies it 
uncovered, Robert Gates argued that: 
 
“In March, all 28 NATO members had voted for the Libya mission, and less than half have 
participated, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission… 
Many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, 
but simply because they can’t. The military capabilities simply aren’t there” (The Guardian 
2011). 
 
Defense in Europe has certainly changed over time. With the DCI and PCC, Andrew Budd 
argues that “back when they were launched, everybody thought that they were all rich”. On 
the current situation, however, Budd argues that now everybody knows that they are all poor. 
He argues “Multinational procurement was a matter of choice, now it is a matter of necessity. 
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The DCI and PCC represented a list of things that was to be done, which was never fully 
completed. Now it is not a list, but a philosophy” (Budd 2014 [Interview]).  
 
The burden-sharing debate, and interests in reforming the Alliance, comes to the fore yet 
again. The empirical data indicate a decrease in defense spending. Considering this in a 
context where the security environment is complex and diverse, and where the Alliance has 
become overburdened, dealing with the deficiencies and challenges and finding the resources 
to do so is difficult. How can the theoretical framework with collective action and the free-
rider problem interpret the decision-making in past capability initiatives, and furthermore say 
something about the progress of Smart Defense? As the hegemonic power in NATO, and 
with the largest contribution to defense, the U.S. is the state with most interests in a new 
direction that lead to a more equitable burden-sharing. As the lessons learned from the DCI 
and PCC indicate, there where diverging interests in living up to the commitments, and these 
patterns indicate that the political will or national interests may in fact influence the progress 
of the Smart Defense initiative. For instance, the U.S. pivot towards the Asia pacific signals 
that the Europeans must take their share of the burden. For the U.S. to emphasize change in 
the Alliance and trying to bring about reforms alone, however, is difficult. Many of the 
European allies, and especially the smaller allies, enjoy the current state of affairs in the 
Alliance.  
 
Since the non-excludable good of collective defense is provided, the allies can free-ride, and 
in so doing the contributions to the alliance are meager compared to the benefits received. 
Because the benefit of collective defense is provided, smaller allies can save resources that 
they instead can use on excludable goods, relating to national priorities. As with Garrett 
Hardin’s “Tragedy of the commons” outlined in chapter three, this free-riding behavior is 
individually rational, but collectively irrational. Furthermore, the increasing gap in defense 
expenditures, and considering the economic situation in Europe, there are no interests for 
European allies in reducing this gap. Consequently, the European allies will choose in line 
with rational, self-interest, and free-ride, contributing little to the alliance. That the allies fail 
to live up to the commitments indicate a collective action problem within the alliance. In 
accordance with Glenn Snyder’s four categories, you could argue that the allies de-align and 
fail to finance and live up to the commitments. This occurred in the DCI and PCC, and it may 
in fact happen with the Smart Defense initiative.  
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The free rider issue constitutes a significant challenge for the alliance. As Sandler argued, if 
NATO were to survive in the long run “then some of these free-riding opportunities must be 
addressed adequately, or else the large NATO allies will see little benefit from the alliance 
unless they place a sufficiently high value on world leadership status” (Sandler and Hartley 
1999: 200). The U.S. in this case will not abandon the alliance, but if not dealt with, the 
burden-sharing problem and the free-riding of the European allies may limit progress in the 
Smart Defense initiative, where resources are needed to make the initiative successful.  
 
Implications on cooperation 
Also important in this context is the issue of interoperability. The reemergence of the burden-
sharing debate, and the recent developments in the strategic environment pose as a challenge 
for Smart Defense in the way that it will affect the interoperability of the Alliance. Between 
the U.S. and Europe, there is a gap in the capabilities. The gap can be defined as 
technological as well as investment and procurement gap. All of this adds up to U.S. 
superiority, meaning that the U.S. is the only member in the Alliance that could project 
power in the form of a large-scale long-range non-nuclear air and missile strikes at distance 
from its homeland (Yost 2000: 98–99).  
 
The implications of these gaps have contributed to the burden-sharing debate. The magnitude 
of the gap between the members became public during “Operation Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm” in 1990-1991. The fact that the U.S. is ahead technologically in the capabilities, 
affects the interoperability of the Alliance, and in turn, its credibility and effectiveness. The 
DCI and PCC attempted to deal with this problem, as the Smart Defense will (Yost 2000: 
101–102). Lessons learned and patterns from the past initiatives show that there is a lack of 
political will and ability to acquire the required capabilities. In changing alliance structure, 
self –interests and rational means-end calculations come into play. The Libyan operation 
revealed these deficiencies. Here, Robert Gates pointed out some of the deficiencies in the 
alliance “the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a 
poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country. Yet many allies are beginning to run 
short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference” (The Guardian 
2011). 
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With the problem of interoperability, especially two points have to be made. For one, in this 
context it seems like Smart Defense is a continuation of the proliferation of defense 
technology in NATO. Europeans suspects that this is an idea that originates from the U.S. to 
“buy American”, which they deem as expensive and unnecessary. There has emerged distrust 
in Europe as well as a view that it is not necessary to use significant resources on defense. 
The same distrust existed with the DCI and the PCC. Two, the Smart Defense initiative is 
trying to promote reforms in national defenses. This, however, may not be in the interests of 
the nations. 
 
Another danger with the Smart Defense initiative is that it can broaden the burden-sharing 
gap. Since reforming entails costs, the existing structure will be favored. The actors involved 
will therefore behave according to self-interest, which will affect the decision-making 
behavior in the reform process. Individual rationality becomes irrational for collective action, 
a tragedy of alliance politics. Smart Defense may in fact become a convenient way to avoid 
providing their share and taking some of the defense burden. The initiative only makes sense 
if it results in new capabilities in the Alliance, or contributes to maintaining capabilities that 
otherwise not could have been sustained. This entails costs for the allies, costs that many are 
unwilling or unable to pay. What the specialization pillar of the initiative could consequently 
do is that the capability goals left by one nation could be shifted over to others. In a European 
perspective, the already existing arrangement in the Alliance will arguably be favored to the 
new. The changes that Smart Defense bring about, may therefore have minimal effect 
because of diverging interests between the allies (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2012). 
 
To deal with this problem, however, the collective action problems of free-riding must be 
solved. The problem of the interoperability in the Alliance adds to the burden-sharing 
problem. In order to increase the interoperability between the allies, the European members 
have to acquire new technology, which costs considerable resources, which they are not able 
or willing to acquire. These gaps can explain why there is an emphasis on the need for 
change and reform in NATO, and furthermore why there is no unity of willingness, both 
militarily and politically, to live up to all of the commitments outlined in capability 
initiatives. Given that the U.S. continuously acquires new high tech assets, there will be 
challenges in closing the technological and doctrinal gap within NATO. There is a difference 
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in threat perception and perception of the initiative itself. Meaning that the focus on crisis 
management and peace support for the European allies, lies as a contrast to the U.S. attention 
to high-tech warfare and homeland defense (Hagman 2002: 103).  
 
Looking at the burden-sharing problem in terms of organizational theory and in a hierarchical 
based instrumental perspective, the hegemonic pressure from U.S., which is based on a cost-
benefit calculation on existing and alternative organizational designs, have led to reforms. 
With the DCI and the PCC, the U.S. assessed alternative designs with more equitable burden 
– sharing as better for their interests, and better for reaching the organizational goals. 
Because of this hegemonic pressure to reform the alliance, however, the implications were 
that there was no clear unity of interests in living up the commitments. Because of diverging 
interests between European allies and the U.S., on more equitable sharing of the defense 
burden, the progress of the DCI and the PCC fell short of expectations.  
 
For Smart Defense, however, the initiative will have difficulties in succeeding because there 
are only few members that have interests in changing the existing structure of the Alliance. In 
hierarchically based instrumental perspective, attempts to bring about reforms derive from 
“organizational leadership”, and even if some actors perceive the existing organizational 
structure and the design of reform processes as unsuitable for realizing their interests, it is 
unlikely that they will be able to change them on their own (Christensen et al. 2007: 133f). 
 
In this context there may be different interests in the structural features of the Alliance, where 
many of the allies align with a structure where the U.S. takes most of the burden. Because of 
domestic politics or national interests, there are difficulties in legitimizing increasing defense 
spending, to deal with the asymmetrical burden-sharing. Andrew Budd argues that the Smart 
Defense initiative will not be able to solve the burden-sharing problem in the Alliance, not in 
its own right. He argues that the problem is not only the procurement capability: 
 
“It is also a fragmentation of the defense industry in Europe, which constitutes a problem. 
The result of this is different procurement in different countries. This in turn affects the 
interoperability. Therefore, all of these initiatives, either it being framework nations, CFI, or 
Smart Defense, together can deal with the hart of the burden sharing problem, not 
individually” (Budd 2014 [Interview]). 	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4.6.2 NATO’s contested mission and reform 
The burden-sharing debate, as well as pooling and sharing, is a significant part of the problem 
for reform processes in NATO. The last part of the problem, which will be discussed here, is 
the debate on the purpose of the Alliance. This issue has influenced previous reform 
processes, and is still relevant today. After the Cold War, the main purpose of the Alliance 
disappeared. With the 1991 Strategic Concept the purpose of the Alliance was widened and 
became more diffuse, which led to different views on what the purpose of the Alliance should 
be. These views were strengthened with the 1999 and the 2010 Strategic Concept, where the 
tasks and missions of NATO grew. According to the instrumental perspective, organizations 
are seen as instruments, and over time, the instrumentality of NATO has become contested. 
As this section will show, the perceived instrumentality of the Alliance changed, and because 
there was no clear and present threat, decision-making became more affected by domestic 
politics.   
 
After the Cold War NATO reassessed its purpose several times and launched reforms in 
order to adapt to the changing security environment. The DCI, PCC and following reform 
processes sought to solve the deficiencies identified from experience from the Balkans, as 
well as adapting to the changing security environment. Lessons learned from past reforms 
indicate that national interests triumph over defense expenditures. Although many of the 
elements in the new initiative are very similar or identical to previous attempts, what is new 
with Smart Defense is the pressing requirement for results. The challenges today are more 
complex and diverse then ever before and with the 2010 Strategic Concept the dual role of 
deterrence and Article 5 mission was strengthened while more tasks and challenges were 
included. To increase the complexity of the problems the Alliance faces, these challenges has 
to be dealt with in a time where many allies are in economic recession and where they are 
still decreasing their defense spending and military structures. How is decision-making 
behavior affected by different views on the purpose of the Alliance?  
 
As discussed in chapter three, the progress of the DCI and the PCC was limited by domestic 
politics, which may also be a threat to Smart Defense. Because NATO became over-
burdened, there were too many missions that were difficult to legitimize, and the members 
prioritized national interests as a result. For especially the European allies alternative 
structures were more expensive, and in terms of domestic politics more difficult to legitimize. 
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This explanation also explains the low political support in the DCI and PCC. Domestic 
politics and national interests affects the political support for capability initiatives in NATO.  
 
Andrew T. Wolff supports the argument that it is NATO’s changing missions and purpose 
that affects the political support (Wolff 2009: 486). He argues that the many reforms in 
NATO have not only created structural tensions relating to the contested issue of the purpose 
of the Alliance, but also political difficulties. He argues that one of the challenges that NATO 
faces is the waning political support for its ambitious endeavors. The decrease in political 
support is a serious challenge for NATO because it signals that the organization has a 
credibility problem. The lack of political support also affects the direction of the Alliance. By 
agreeing, but not committing, to the different reforms signals that there is little interest in 
changing the Alliance, making the prospects for the reforms succeeding very bleak. Adding 
new tasks makes it far more difficult to get member states to agree and to make tangible 
commitments to the diverse and complex mission set of the transformed NATO. National 
priorities and lack of political support are resulting in limited progress in the initiatives. 
These factors has affected the reform process of the DCI and PCC, and will also pose as a 
serious problem for the progress of Smart Defense (Ibid). 
 
What NATO attempts with the Smart Defense are similar to the Harmel Report. The Harmel 
Report contributed with a set of responsibilies for the Alliance. Some structural changes 
occurred and the report marked the increased importance of the political side of NATO’s 
activities. No time was wasted in translating the Harmel mandate into alliance policy. When 
the North Atlantic Council met in Reykjavik, Iceland in June 1968, the allies issued a 
“Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions” (Sloan 1985: 46). The Harmel 
Report is important here because Smart Defense can be seen as an attempt at gaining the 
same legitimacy and support as the Report did. There are several characteristics in Smart 
Defense that try to change some of the underlying conflicts in the Alliance, which has not 
been dealt with in many years.  
 
The debate on the purpose of the Alliance today is similar to previous debates. Out of the 
Harmel report, flexible response was born. When flexible response was adopted in 1967, it 
enabled NATO to move away from the “trip-wire” strategy of MAD, while leading the 
degree of commitment to a conventional defense ambiguous. What flexible response did was 
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to solve the problem of balancing risk in the Alliance, satisfying both the U.S. with reducing 
the risk of nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, and the European concern to reduce the 
risk of a conventional conflict confined to Europe (Stromseth 1988: 194). The disagreement 
of an Alliance focusing on Article 5 or conflict management operations is still relevant today, 
and is an underlying issue that previous initiatives has tried to solve. In the current context, 
the debate on the purpose of the alliance is more relevant than ever. Because of the economic 
austerity, and with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, there are different views on the 
continued purpose of NATO. Like with flexible response, with Smart Defense, NATO tries 
to make a strategic change. The change entails the allies’ capabilities become multinational, 
with specialization and pooling and sharing of the resources as solutions to the many 
deficiencies in the Alliance. 
 
Like the Harmel Report, Smart Defense seeks to reaffirm the image, responsibilities and 
functions of the Alliance. The big difference, however, is that there was a massive consensus 
around the Harmel Report, which is not the case with Smart Defense. Experience from 
previous initiatives and recent developments indicate that political support around the Smart 
Defense initiative is low, which may consequently translate into limited progress. The 
initiative is another burden to an already over-burdened alliance. Members may have 
different perception of what the purpose of the Alliance should be or do. Having many tasks 
may be difficult to legitimize for national governments and its voters, which make domestic 
politics also important in this debate. Because the many reforms and continuously changing 
purpose strain the members, who require resources that the allies does not have, the political 
support suffers. Means-end calculations result in actions that emphasize domestic politics 
over collective action. Domestic factors shape foreign policy decision-making, where it sets 
the limits and form the rationality. The interests and motives of the allies influence their 
commitment to alliance ventures, and DCI and PCC proves, national interests is prioritized, 
which results in limited results in reforms. 	  
The effect of the changing purpose of NATO, and as this thesis has shown, is that the 
Alliance is in a permanent state of uncertainty. This argument is supported by Webber et al. 
that argues that adaption to meet “new security challenges” either it has been the end of the 
Cold War, Bosnia, Kosovo, 9/11, Afghanistan, Libya and beyond – has been a constant 
theme within NATO. NATO has seemingly come through these changes, but as Webber et al. 
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argues the picture is of an Alliance in a permanent state of uncertainty and flux (Webber, 
Sperling, and Smith 2012: 10).  There is arguably a growing heterogeneity within NATO. 
This tendency can be seen in divergent strategic orientations and different perceptions of the 
purpose of NATO. The U.S. picot towards Pacific is an example, where their strategic 
challenges largely emanate out of the Pacific region. Graeme P. Herd and John Kriendler 
argue that this highlights the declining strategic importance of Europe in U.S. strategic 
thinking. This argument has been strengthened by the reduction of ground troops. Despite of 
this development, however, the U.S. still has significant interests in Europe, and recent 
developments in the Ukraine may have some implications on the further debates on the 
purpose of the Alliance. The implications of this, however, are too early to tell (Herd and 
Kriendler 2013: 3). 
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4.7 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has outlined and analyzed several factors that may determine likelihood of the 
NATO Smart Defense initiative achieving its stated objectives. As discussed, NATO is 
currently dealing with several challenges that may influence the progress and success of the 
initiative. The thesis has shown that the mechanisms of the Smart Defense initiatives will in 
fact allow free-riding behavior. Because the organizational culture has become path 
dependent, and because there is no clear and present threat, the organization is difficult to 
change. 
 
The argument in this thesis has been that the internal challenges in the Alliance, whether it is 
the purpose of the alliance, the asymmetrical burden-sharing, the problems of interoperability 
or problems in changing the organizational culture, are all factors that may limit the progress 
of the Smart Defense initiative. These causal mechanisms come into play in determining 
success or failure in reform processes in NATO. In regards to the Smart Defense, has NATO 
learned the right lessons from past attempts?  Erik Breidlid argues that the lessons learned 
from DCI and PCC was taken into account with the Smart Defense initiative, in the sense that 
the initiative is in a much greater extent left to the member states. Breidlid argues that:  
 
“From experience cooperative projects must primarily derive from the countries own needs, 
and NATO’s role in this process is to function as a catalyst and coordinator for reform. Here 
the industrial interests, as well as political priorities affect this process, and the Alliance has 
limited influence in this process. In this contexts, every country will naturally protect its own 
defense industry, both for economic and national security reasons” (Breidlid 2014 
[Correspondence]). 
 
Lessons learned from past initiatives have indicated that there has been a pattern of growing 
emphasis on national interests. This problem, however, is also present today.  An important 
note here is that the Smart Defense initiative, which is the focus of this thesis, is an ongoing 
process. Conclusively confirming or disproving a hypothesis on its success is therefore not 
possible. The findings can, however, give some indications as for the assumptions formulated 
in the hypothesis, and thereby on the progress of the Smart Defense initiative.  
 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that Smart Defense will have little chance of success due to collective 
action problems in sharing of the defense burden. The thesis has shown that by taking 
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diverging interests, collective action problems and the problem of interoperability into 
consideration, and informed by past experiences, the initiative may yield limited results. The 
non-excludable good of defense in the Alliance enables free-riding behavior. Member states 
focus their resources on excludable goods, such as national priorities. This, in turn, affects the 
burden-sharing and consequently the political will to live up to the commitments outlined in 
the Smart Defense initiative. The findings therefore indicate that the initiative will have little 
chance of success.  
 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that Smart Defense will have little chance of success due to diverging 
preferences between member states. Because the allies focus on national priorities as opposed 
to collective defense, and because of the contested views on the purpose of the alliance, the 
argument is that Smart Defense will have little chance of success. The lack of unity in the 
interests, the inability of the European allies to take some of the burden, and the lack of 
political will to deal with the many tasks and missions of NATO, will all contribute to limited 
progress. Without any incentives for living up to alliance commitments, the progress of 
capability initiatives will remain limited. This indicates that Smart Defense will yield limited 
results. 
 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that Smart Defense will have little change of success because the 
institutionalized organizational structure is path dependent. Lessons from past initiatives, and 
patterns that have emerged over time indicate that the norms, values and the identity of the 
Alliance have Cold War characteristics.  The Cold War legacy is institutionalized at the level 
that it is too hard to change. This is reflected in the defense spending, the political will and 
the internal debates within the Alliance. Lessons learned from the limited success of DCI and 
PCC indicates that the European allies are reluctant to implement agreed reforms because of 
the embedded environment with U.S. protection. This makes the Alliance path dependent and 
difficult to change. Changes in threat perception may bring about reform, but path 
dependency limits the progress. The findings therefore suggest that Smart Defense will yield 
limited progress. 
 
Hypothesis 4 suggests that Smart Defense will have little chance of success due to inefficient 
reform designs. Lessons learned from previous initiatives, and patterns that has emerged over 
time, indicates that NATO adopts organizational structures that seem rational, efficient and 
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modern, but these structures are not necessarily optimal or efficient. These reforms do, 
however, achieve legitimacy in the organizational environment. Smart Defense may be 
considered as the rational way to structure an organization in a time of austerity, but because 
of the mechanisms of the initiative with pooling and sharing of resources, the initiative may 
yield limited success. The Alliance is not ready to make their capabilities multinational and to 
specialize their forces. 
 
In sum, the hypotheses indicate that the NATO Smart Defense initiative will have little 
chance of reaching its stated objectives. The findings suggest that European allies will 
continue to free-ride on the contributions of defense expenditure to NATO. This is because 
there are no incentives that make an alternative strategy more preferable. The U.S. remains 
the defense producer and European allies continue to be the defense consumers. Furthermore, 
Smart Defense will have difficulties reforming the alliance because structures are hard to 
change, and because of path dependent structure within the Alliance. In addition, 
heterogeneity has evolved within the alliance, where different interests and goals between the 
allies affect the political will to live up to alliance commitments. The implications of the 
internal debates are that there is no agreement on the function of the alliance, and as the 
lessons from past initiative has shown, this translates into a lack of political support. Without 
support, reform processes fail to reach its stated objectives. Referring to Glenn Snyder, on the 
DCI and PCC, it seems like the allies defected on the alliance commitments.  
 
All of these patterns indicate that the solution and the problem seem to be the same, that 
under U.S. pressure, the initiatives fail. Without the U.S. and without its resources, however, 
the Smart Defense initiative is deemed to fail. With the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 
future for NATO is uncertain. Changes in the international system, with emerging conflicts 
may in turn change the incentives for the European allies. This may result in increased 
defense spending. With the development in Europe, collective defense may become more 
relevant than ever. This is something that is unique for Smart Defense, compared to past 
initiatives. For now, the problems with collective action and free-riding, as well as the 
burden-sharing issues, pooling and sharing difficulties, and the debate on the purpose of the 
alliance, has been, and still is, influential on reform processes in NATO. Adding threat 
perception, path dependency argument and inefficient reform designs to this, the argument is 
that the Smart Defense initiative will fail to achieve its stated objectives. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis went out to find what past experience can tell us about the likelihood of the 
NATO Smart Defense initiative achieving its stated objectives. The motivation of this thesis 
was to assess a relatively new capability initiative in light of previous experience to identify 
the factors that come into play in reform processes in NATO. This thesis has tried to 
contribute to the already vast research field on NATO. In the thesis, a case study approach 
with process tracing and triangulation was applied. In order to answer the research question 
the chosen theoretical perspective was a combination of the collective action problem and 
free-riding with the three perspectives on organizations.  
 
It is not difficult to conclude that the Smart Defense initiative may suffer the same fate as the 
DCI and PCC, in light of recent trends and experience from past initiatives. Concluding this 
on the basis of these factors, however, would be an oversimplified conclusion and a 
fragmented picture of the reality. This thesis provided with an analysis of the different 
initiatives in several perspectives. This was to see if there has been any previous success, to 
identify the factors that affected the reform process and to see what the lessons learned could 
say about the Smart Defense initiative, which is an ongoing process. 
 
The thesis finds that because of a lack of incentive to contribute to a more equitable burden 
sharing, European allies will continue to free-ride. Furthermore, a path dependent structure 
that is hard to change, diverging interests and a lack of political will, are all factors that 
influence the progress of the initiative. Lessons learned from past initiatives indicate that 
these factors may limit the progress of Smart Defense. What does the findings in this thesis 
mean for NATO and the Smart Defense initiative? This thesis finds that lessons learned from 
past experience indicate that Smart Defense will have difficulties in achieving its stated 
objectives. With Smart Defense, the Alliance has tried a semi-structured solution where 
different allies contribute and tries different solutions to solve the deficiencies. In order to be 
successful, a change of pace in the Alliance has to happen. There are no indications, however, 
of such a change. Therefore, in theory and practice, it seems that Smart Defense will yield as 
much progress as its predecessors. The logic or the factors driving the initiative, on the other 
hand, is not weakened. There is still a need to bolster the capabilities, and there are several 
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gaps in burden-sharing and interoperability, which in turn weakens the Alliance. The 
mechanisms of Smart Defense that seek to deal with these deficiencies, however, seems 
difficult to carry out in a time of austerity. NATO has no capacity by itself to finance major 
procurement projects, so the capabilities must be underpinned by adequate defense 
expenditures. This requires commitment to the alliance ventures. 
 
The Smart Defense initiative points to a multinational solution of capabilities. This thesis has 
shown that it is difficult to achieve. The DCI and PCC tried to work around this. The DCI 
was driven by hegemonic pressure with U.S. interests. The PCC was an extension of those 
interests with more coordinated efforts by the allies. The Alliance, however, seems not ready 
for the capabilities to become multinational. Therefore, rational thinking and self-interests 
with national priorities is emphasized at the costs of bolstering the alliance. The findings in 
this thesis provide only a little explanation of a generally complex problem that NATO faces. 
Events will always contribute to change the incentives, so this is not the last to be written 
about the Smart Defense initiative. One argument is that U.S. politics as well as incentives in 
the international system will be decisive for the Smart Defense initiative. Interesting enough, 
the conflicts in Ukraine can change this and increase defense spending, and thereby increase 
the actions available for the Alliance. The effect of the developments in Ukraine, however, is 
too early to say. As for the Smart Defense initiative, it may seem to be the rational way to 
reform an Alliance in austerity, but it is not obvious that the initiative is the right solution to 
the problem. Further research on this is therefore necessary. 
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Appendix B – Illustrative interview guide – 
Questions 
Questions on NATO transformation and Smart Defense 
1. Is Smart Defense an initiative that has derived from collective interest, or individual 
members? (or possibly the Secretary General?) 
2. Regarding the multinational projects. How important are they really, and how difficult are 
they to complete?  
3. What progress has been made with Smart Defense? 
4. What can limit progress in the Smart Defense initiative? 
5. Smart Defense is very similar to the DCI and PCC, both in rhetoric and in priorities, and the 
two previous initiative both yielded limited results. What is different with Smart Defense? 
Why should the capability initiative succeed this time? 
6. Does the existence of ACT make a difference in implementing Smart Defense? 
7. Many argue that the different constituents of SD are difficult to make a reality. What do you 
think are the greatest challenges in making the initiative successful? 
8. Which countries are enthusiastic about the initiative? 
9. For those who embrace the reforms, is there any strategic advantage in the alliance? 
10. How was the initiative received in the member states when it was launched? Muted 
response? 
11. Would you agree that members focusing on national priorities might cause the initiative to 
yield limited progress? 
12. Will Smart Defense be able to address and possibly resolve the burden-sharing problem? 
13. Any comments on the idea of pooling and sharing? 
14. Regarding previous initiatives, what lessons can be learned from the DCI and the PCC? 
 
